DOES THE CONSTITUTION
PREVENT THE DISCHARGE OF
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES?
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He'll sit here . . .and he'll say "Do this! Do that!" And

nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the
Army. He'll find it very frustrating.
Harry S. Truman*
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The dramatic expansion of the size and scope of government in the last twenty years' has made government the pivotal
force in the development of American society. The quality of
that society is thus significantly influenced by the quality of those
who decide and implement governmental policies. Yet the increase in the importance of government has been accompanied
by a decrease in the level of public confidence in the government
work force. The public reaction evidences doubt whether the
government, as presently constituted, has the ability to carry out
its expanded responsibilities.2 Government personnel seem not
only ineffective but also unresponsive either to the public or to
elected officials; the bureaucracy has developed a life of its own.
Efforts abound to make the government more accountable to the
'The percentage of the nation's work force attributable to government employment has almost doubled in the last twenty years, to a current total of about 15.7%.
Compare ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 57 (1975) with SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 136 (1975). The percentage
of the nation's gross national product attributable to civilian government expenditures
has also doubled in the same period and now exceeds 25%. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TRENDS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 1954-1974, at 1 (1975).
As a result, the tax burden of the average family has doubled during the same period.
Id. 3. These increases are attributable in part to a significant shift in federal budgetary
emphasis from defense and foreign affairs to income support and social programs,
increasing these domestic expenditures from 27.3% to 49% of the federal budget since
1960. B. BLECHMAN, E. GRAMLICH & R. HARTMAN, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE
1976 BUDGET 4-8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BLECHMAN]. The expansion of the scope
of state and local government activities has exceeded even that of the federal government, in part because of a federal policy of implementing its programs through grantsin-aid to states and localities, causing these grants to grow nine-fold in dollar amount
since 1960 (amounting to a 6% increase within overall federal outlays), and in part
because of locally generated pressures to expand governmental activity to such areas as
drug addiction, pollution control, and consumer protection. Id. 8; C. SCHULTZE, E.
FRIED, A. RIVLIN & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1973 BUDGET
292-302 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SCHULTZE1. See generally THE BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 8-10 (1975) (Budget Message of the
President); Special Analysis 0, Federal Aid to State and Local Government, in SPECIAL
ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 235-51
(1975); U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra.
2 The widespread cynicism about government, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1974,
§ 1 at 43, col. 7 (voter cynicism about the conduct of elected officials impels state campaign spending regulations and ethics law reform), is reflected in the increasing
number of politicians questioning the value and wisdom of government's attempts to
solve social problems. See, e.g., Reeves, "How Does the Governor of CaliforniaDifferfrom.a
Shoemaker?," N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § 6 pt. 1 (Magazine), at 8. One approach to
the expansion of government is to question how it can be justified. See R. NozIct,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). In this Article, I assume the existence of an important role for government in our society and seek ways to improve the ability of the
government to perform the responsibilities given it.
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public through open meeting laws, 3 increased access to public
records,4 citizen participation in the formulation of policy, 5 decentralization of government functions,6 and requirements that
government articulate the rationale behind its policies prior to
taking important actions. 7 But no amount of citizen involvement
in policymaking can compensate for an inadequate government
work force. Government's effectiveness and responsiveness depend on the quality and management of governmental personnel. That personnel administration plays an essential governmental role is underscored by the fact that employee costs
account for most government expenditures at the state and local
level 8 and for most controllable expenditures at the federal level. 9 Even an attempt to improve the process of government simply to eliminate budgetary deficits'" must concentrate
on personnel policy.
Government's ability to improve personnel policy-whether
for reasons of governmental effectiveness or efficiencyis now limited both by the civil service system and by unionization of government employees. The growing impact of public
employee unions on government operations, both because of
the unions' contractual rights and their increasing political
power, has been widely noted." The more pervasive restrictions

I See, e.g.,

CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-61 (West Supp. 1975). See generally Wickham,

Let the Sun Shine In! Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and

Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480 (1973); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press
Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199 (1962); Comment, Pennsylvanias

"Sunshine Law": Problems of Construction and Enforcement, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 536 (1975).
4See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp.
IV, 1974). See generally Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974); Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for
Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (1973); Comment, In Camera Inspections

Under the Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 557 (1974); Comment, National
Security and the Public's Right to Know: A New Role for the Courts Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1438 (1975).

5See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2781(a) (1970);
New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §
7384(11) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
6 See, e.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 2564 (McKinney 1970).

"See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (1970).
8 U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL
EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 33 (1973): "Labor-related costs, including both salary costs and provisions for fringe benefits, constitute 70 to 80 percent
of most city budgets."
9 BLECHMAN, supra note 1, at 198, 204.
'1Od. 10, 70.
"See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971);
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attributable to civil service laws, which, unlike unionization, are
uniquely governmental, have not been adequately subjected to
similar scrutiny. Yet most government employees are now protected by civil service,' 2 and the civil service system is a basic
cause of the peculiar inability of the government to improve its
standard of performance. The critical fact of civil service today is
that covered employees are rarely discharged from government
for inadequately doing their jobs.' 3 The civil service system has
provided the equivalent of life tenure (at least until retirement)
once a brief probation period is passed, absent what the government considers a serious act of misconduct. As a result, government no longer effectively enforces a minimum level of quality in the work performance of its employees. Even when the.
government is forced to discharge employees because of a
budgetary deficit, the initial effort is to protect the jobs of the
civil servants at the expense of uncovered workers; the issue is
not which particular employees are the most effective in their
jobs. 14 Concern over the effect of this permanent tenure for
government employees is widespread. "Virtually every round
table discussion of problems facing public managers will quickly
turn to the inability of the manager to discipline nonproductive
or insubordinate employees or to dismiss those who have ceased

Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1973);
Summers, Public Employee Bargaining:A PoliticalPerspective 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974).
12See Merrill, Proceduresfor Adverse Actions Against FederalEmployees, 59 VA. L. REV.
196 (1973): "Today 2.5 million employees, more than 85 percent of the federal workforce, are within the competitive service." Similarly, a 1970 survey conducted by the
National Civil Service League found that 96% of the states, 83% of the counties, and
84% of the cities surveyed had civil service systems. Peirce, Proposed Reforms Spark Civil
Service Debate, 7 NAT'L J. 1673, 1674 (1975). See generally Kaufman, The Growth of the
Federal Personnel System, in THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE 41-43 (W. Sayre ed.

1965).
1" The United States Civil Service Commission reported to me that from 300 to 500
individuals annually, out of a total of more than two million civilian federal employees,
were separated for inefficiency by the federal government for the fiscal years
1972-1974. For an example of state experience and reactions thereto, see Osterman &
Austin, New York State's Disciplinary Arbitration Procedure, 47 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 181-83
(1975).
14 Even in the 1975 budget crisis in New York City, the first 5,050 employees to be
discharged consisted entirely of "provisional," non-civil service workers. N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1975, at 46, col. 1. Although as the crisis deepened, the Mayor eventually did
discharge some civil servants, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1975, at 1, col. 8 (dismissals based
upon seniority), a number of these were later rehired. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1975, at 1,
col. 8. Whatever the eventual number of workers discharged, it seems doubtful that a
judgment about which jobs are most important to the operation of the government will
overcome the demand to protect civil service workers first.
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to be productive or constitute chronic supervisory problems."1 5
Strengthening the ability of government managers to ensure
adequate employee work performance is an essential ingredient
in reforming government administration. Although any large
organization has the problem of motivating employees and improving their performance while providing adequate job security, the government today is subject to two basic restrictions
of its power over its employees that are inapplicable to private
enterprise: It can discipline or discharge its employees only
for "cause" and it must provide them with procedural protections in determining the existence of that cause. Of these two
limitations, the procedural protections most restrict the government's ability to enforce a standard of job performance. Incompetence is generally assumed to be sufficient "cause" for termination. But the procedures that must be followed to establish
incompetence make such terminations extremely unlikely. The
problem of adequately defining a standard of competence, particularly in the higher-level and more important jobs, the uncertainty about the kind of evidence needed to prove a violation
of that standard, the unpleasant nature of a formal confrontation between people with a personal, empoyer-employee relationship, and the supervisor's view that he, not the employee,
will be put on trial-together with the natural reluctance to fire
anyone in any event-combine to prevent legitimate discharges
for incompetence. The result is that the level of competence in
16
government declines.
Changes in the present personnel removal procedure as
a step toward improving the caliber of government personnel,
"sJ. MACY, PUBLIC SERVICE: THE HUMAN SIDE OF GOVERNMENT 20 (1971). The
author was Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission under President Johnson.
16 Some writers have said that the allegation of a causal relationship between the
procedural requirements for termination and the permanency of tenure in government
service contains both "truth and error," id., or is "part real, part imagined," Osterman
& Austin, supra note 13, at 182. Whether it is more the supervisor's fears of the
procedural requirements than the requirements themselves that prevent discharges
cannot, and need not, be determined. In either event, the discharges are not made.
The damaging effect of the procedures on the government's personnel management
has been documented elsewhere. See, e.g., U.S. CONINI'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE 67-70 (1955).
The allegation that it is in fact easy to discharge employees by present procedures, see,
e.g., R. VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM 14-15 (1975), is rejected by experienced
government executives. Interview with William Druz, Chief Examiner, N.J. Civil Service
Commission, May 8, 1975. See Laing, Civil Service Setup, Born as Reform Idea, Now Hit by
Reformers, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 6. See generally text accompanying notes
239-67 infra.
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however, may not be possible. Since the Supreme Court decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth,'7 Perry v. Sindermann,'8 and
Arnett v. Kennedy, 1 9 any consideration of reforming the method
of discharging government employees for incompetence must
start with a constitutional question: Is the present procedure for
discharging employees, entailing a full evidentiary hearing on
the issue of competence, constitutionally required? Can any legislation modify the civil service system's present balance between
enforcing a level of competence and protecting employee rights?
This Article addresses these questions, concluding that despite
Roth, Sindermann, and Arnett, the Constitution does permit the
Congress and the President to modify the government's personnel removal process. Part II outlines the origins of the
executive's power to discharge government employees, the extent to which the civil service system was designed to modify that
power, and the judicial role prior to Roth and Sindermann in
affecting the employer-employee relationship. Part III analyzes
how Roth, Sindermann, and Arnett have changed, or ought to
change, the historic role of the courts and the Constitution in
reviewing the executive's decision to discharge a government
employee considered incompetent.
II.

THE POWER TO REMOVE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES:
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The FirstHundred Years
Efforts to balance the government's flexibility in personnel
actions against adequate protection of individual employee rights
date from the nation's beginning. On May 19, 1789, during
the debate in the first session of Congress over the creation
of the first executive department, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Representative James Madison moved that the Secre20
tary of the Department be removable by the President alone.
William Smith of South Carolina objected, arguing that removal
should require conviction upon impeachment. 2 1 This exchange
launched two months of debate on the extent of the President's
17 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
18 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
19416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality decision).
20 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 385-86 (1789) [1789-1791]
Madison).
21 Id.
387 (remarks of Representative Smith).

(remarks of Representative
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removal powers, a debate "many times described as one of the
ablest constitutional debates which has taken place in Congress
since the adoption of the Constitution. ' 22 The issue of the debate, the balance between the need for security for government
employees and the need for their responsiveness to elected
officials-between the dangers and the utility of allowing executive discretion in disciplining employees-was central to the creation of the executive's role in the new government.
William Smith was the most forceful advocate for limiting
the President's removal power as a protection for the individual's
rights, relying on Alexander Hamilton's view of the President's
power as expounded in The Federalist, Number 77.23 Smith argued that unlimited executive discretion to remove would deter
worthy people from accepting office and would make officials
once appointed so susceptible to presidential power that they
would not dare to challenge abuse of authority:
If we give this power [of removal] to the President, he
may, from caprice, remove the most worthy men from
office. His will and pleasure will be the slight tenure by
which an office is to be held ....
...[I]t ought to be considered, that the person who
is appointed will probably quit some other office or
business in which he is occupied. Ought he, after
making this sacrifice in order to serve the public, to
be turned out of place, without even a reason being
assigned for such behavior? . . . The public suppose
him guilty of malpractices. Hence his reputation is
blasted, his property sacrificed. I say his property is
sacrificed, because I consider his office as his property. He is stripped of this, and left exposed to the
malevolence of the world, contrary to the principles
of the constitution and contrary to the principles
of all free Governments, which are, that no man shall
be despoiled of his property, but by a fair and impar24
tial trial.
James Madison, the leading advocate of presidential power, replied in a speech that has remained the basic argument for the
executive's power of removal:
22 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 329 (1897).
23 THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 485 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); 1 ANNALS OF

CONG. 474-75 (1789) [1789-1791] (remarks of Representative Smith).

24 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 476 (1789) [1789-1791] (remarks of Representative Smith).
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The danger to liberty, the danger of mal-administration, has not yet been found to lie so much in the
facility of introducing improper persons into office, as
in the difficulty of displacing those who are unworthy
of the public trust. If it is said, that an officer once
appointed shall not be displaced without the formality
required by impeachment, I shall be glad to know what
security we have for the faithful administration of the
Government? Every individual, in the long chain which
extends from the highest to the lowest link of the Executive Magistracy, would find a security in his situation
which would relax his fidelity and promptitude in the
discharge of his duty....
Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the
President, and you abolish at once that great principle
of unity and responsibility in the executive department,
which was intended for the security of liberty and the
public good ....
[I]f anything in its nature is executive,
it must be that power which is employed in superintending and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.
Ultimately, the House of Representatives decisively adopted
Madison's approach favoring executive authority, and the Senate
agreed, although only by virtue of the tie-breaking vote of the
Vice President.2 6 The result, known as the Decision of 1789,
remained the basis of executive power in employee relations,
with brief exceptions, until the last thirty years. Even Represen28
tative Smith later changed his mind, 27 as did Hamilton himself.
After the Decision of 1789, the President's absolute power
of removal of federal employees was established in principle but
was not exercised in fact. Indeed, for the first thirty years of the
country's history, with the exception of Jefferson's attempt to
modify the political balance of the government work force,29
2

5 Id. 515-16, 518-19 (remarks of Representative Madison).
26 Id. 600-08. See D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-27
(1971) [hereinafter cited as ROSENBLOOM].
27 ROSENBLOOM, supra note 26, at 29 n.17.

28 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 137 (1926).

29 Thomas Jefferson could not have been as complacent with the composition of
the civil service as his predecessors had been, because he found the entire apparatus of
government manned by people loyal to the opposition party, some of whom had been
appointed by John Adams in his last days as President. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803). To redress the political balance of the government, Jefferson
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removals were rare, and those made were for cause.3 0 As the
federal service grew considerably during these years, 3 1 the tradition was created not only of stability in the federal service but of
property in office. As a result, by 1828 the federal service had
become unresponsive, inefficient, and filled with sinecures.3 2
Moreover, these employees represented an era not in keeping
with the democratic spirit of the times: "When the people voted
in 1828 that John Quincy Adams should leave office, they undoubtedly intended to vote that most of the civil servants should
33
go with him.
Efforts to revise the concept of property in office and to
force government to be more responsive to the electorate preceded the election of 1828, beginning with the passage of the
Tenure of Office Act of 1820.'4 The Act established a fixed term
of four years for a wide variety of federal offices and made clear
that removals even within that term were at the pleasure of the
President. One purpose of the Act was to overcome the reluctance of executives to discharge employees by having public employees removed automatically, thus not impugning their
character.3 5 But neither Monroe, who reluctantly signed the Act,
nor John Quincy Adams, who routinely reappointed employees
after their terms had expired, used the Act's power. Madison
removed more than 25% of federal officers of the presidential class and is therefore
considered the founder of the spoils system in the United States. C. FISH, THE CIVIL
SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 42, 51 (1904) [hereinafter cited as FISH]; P. VAN RIPER,
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 23 (1958) [hereinafter cited as VAN
RIPER].

1oPresident Washington, who had complete freedom to create his own federal
service, had little reason to exercise his power of removal. His removals were rare and
only for reasons of character or efficiency. FISH, supra note 29, at 13; VAN RIPER, supra
note 29, at 19. John Adams continued Washington's practice of providing security of
tenure for government employees, although his administration is credited with the first
removal for purely political reasons. FISH, supra note 29, at 19. Once Jefferson had
established the new political balance in the government, see note 29 supra, Presidents
from his political party-Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams-reaffirmed the
tradition of making very few removals for any reason, see ROSENBLOOM, supra note 26,
at 41-42, 65, even though Madison himself had been the instrumental force in asserting
the existence of the President's absolute power of removal. F. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PUBLIC SERVICE 58-59 (1968).
31 VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 24.
31 See generally FISH, supra note 29, at 77-78; VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 33.
33FISH, supra note 29, at 78.
11 Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582.
35 This purpose was envisioned at least by the Act's principal sponsor, William H.
Crawford, President Monroe's Secretary of the Treasury. FISH, supra note 29, at 66-70.
The Act also laid the foundation for the principle that each President should have a
number of offices to fill every four years, a proposition not previously accepted.

DISCHARGE OF CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES

1976]

thought that the Act was unconstitutional, considering it an impermissible congressional incursion into the presidential power
to remove (or retain) employees. 36 Not until Andrew Jackson's
election in 1828 did the philosophy of turnover in government
become accepted.
Jackson was not the first to fill public offices for political
reasons; political appointments had been made commonly in a
number of states 37 and occasionally on the federal level. He was,
however, the first President to do so avowedly as a means of
reform of governmental policy. In his first annual message, he
articulated the need for a politically responsive turnover of the
public service:
Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense. No individual wrong is,
therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment
to nor continuance in office is a matter of right. The
incumbent became an officer with a view to public
benefits, and when these require his removal they are
not to be sacrificed to private interests. . . . [Acceptance of this view] would destroy the idea of property
now so generally connected with official station, and
although individual distress may be sometimes produced, it would, by promoting that rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed, give
healthful action to the system.3 8
Jackson's efforts to change the composition of the federal service
were circumspect. His removals, although substantial, probably
totaled no more than twenty percent of federal employees. 3 9
Even so, his exercise of presidential power met considerable opposition in the Congress and reopened the debate over the
36

Id. 67.

37 See generally id. 79-104.

38 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897,
at 449 (J. Richardson ed. 1898). Jackson viewed the automatic rotation of government
offices as one possibility:
I can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office
than is generally to be gained by their experience. I submit, therefore, to your
consideration whether the efficiency of the Government would not be promoted and official industry better secured by a general extension of the law
which limits appointments to four years.
Id. See FISH, supra note 29, at 111-12.
19 ROSENBLOOM, supra note 26, at 54. Jacksoh did, however, remove 252 out of 610
presidential officers. Id.
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proper extent of the President's removal power. Daniel Webster
attacked the finality of the Decision of 1789; John C. Calhoun
recommended the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act of 1820
and proposed a requirement that the President inform the
Senate of reasons for a removal; Henry Clay introduced a resolution suggesting that removals be made only with the concurrence of the Senate. 40 But efforts to curb the President's re4
moval power died in the House of Representatives. '
The rapid changes of presidency and party in the twentyfive years following Jackson's administration may help to explain
why the spoils system became the routine of American politics
during that period. As the years passed, the size and scope of
political removals increased; people seeking jobs filled the capital
after each election. 42 Finally, with the election of the Republican
Lincoln in 1860, the removals reached their peak: 1457 of the
1639 presidential appointees were replaced. 43 The tradition of
tenure had been replaced by a tradition of turnover.
Although several statutes of limited scope were enacted during Lincoln's administration to assert a legislative check on executive patronage power, 4 4 congressional fear of President Andrew Johnson's use of the removal power occasioned the first
major reversal of the traditional reliance on executive discretion in removals, the Tenure of Office Act of 1867. 45 The Act
was intended not as a bulwark of individual rights, but as a congressional effort to establish its own power against the President. The Act provided that individuals appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate could be
removed only with the concurrence of the Senate. 46 President
40
41

supra note 29, at 141-42; VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 39-40.
VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 40-41.
FISH,

42 Although relative stability continued under Van Buren (who was, like Jackson, a
Democrat), the Whigs were elected in 1841, and they decided to follow Jackson's
precedent by removing a large number of people on political grounds. The Whigs were
replaced by the Democrats in 1845, who were replaced by the Whigs in 1849, with the
Democrats returning in 1853. Each election produced a substantial turnover in
government. Even James Buchanan, who succeeded a fellow Democrat, removed a
large number of employees, expanding the spoils system to comprehend the routine
transfer of government jobs to those loyal to the newly elected President. See FISH, supra
note 29, at 143-72.

43 Id.
44 Id.
41

170.
187.

Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430.

46 The President had the power only to suspend the appointees pending Senate

action. Id. § 2.
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Johnson vetoed the bill as unconstitutional, citing the unbroken
history of sole presidential power of removal; Congress overrode his veto.47 Expecting to force a judicial resolution of the
constitutionality of this congressional limitation of the President's
removal powers, Johnson, on May 13, 1867, suspended Secretary of War Stanton and, without making reference to the Tenure of Office Act, notified the Senate of this action. The Senate, pursuant to the Act, refused to agree to the suspension on
January 13, 1868, and on February 21, Johnson announced
Stanton's removal and replacement. The House at once proceeded to impeach the President but the Senate refused to convict, influenced in part by the failure of the literal wording of
the Act to protect Stanton.4 8
The constitutional crisis over the Tenure of Office Act of
1867 raised anew the fundamental question posed by Madison in
the 1780's and by Jackson in the 1830's: Should the President
have unlimited authority to remove his appointees? Judicial affirmation of presidential power did not come until 1926, 4 9 and,
during the period of constitutional uncertainty following
Johnson's ajquittal, Congress continued its legislative efforts to
limit presidential power. 50 But because the Senate rarely exercised the power given by legislation to overturn a President's
removal (although it frequently rejected presidential appointments), the practice of the President alone removing his employees largely survived the battle over the Tenure of Office
Act of 1867.51 Meanwhile, the battleground over the President's
powers over government employment shifted from limitations of
the President's power to remove employees to limits on his
power to appoint them. The Tenure of Office Act of 1867 be47

See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1977 (1867); FISH, supra note 29, at 197.
48 Originally, the bill exempted cabinet officers altogether, but because of pressure
by the House, the final bill provided that cabinet officers would hold office for the term
of the President who appointed them and a month thereafter, subject to removal by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. FISH, supra note 29, at 196-97. Appointment or removal contrary to the Act was specifically declared to be a "high misdemeanor." Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, § 9, 14 Stat. 431. Stanton, however, had been appointed
by Lincoln and not by Johnson. See FIsH, supra, at 198-201.
49 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164-68 (1926); see text accompanying notes
106-17 infra.
'0 The Tenure of Office Act was not repealed for 20 years, Act of Mar. 3, 1887,
ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500, and other similar laws were enacted, e.g., Act of July 12, 1876, ch.
179, § 6, 19 Stat. 80 (appointment and removal of postmasters). See FISH, supra note 29,
at 201-08.
51FISH, supra note 29, at 201-04.
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came, at least to its defenders, merely a step toward civil service
reform.

52

B.

Civil Service Reform

The civil service reform movement, which consisted of efforts to establish standards for appointment to government service, began with several bills introduced in the mid-1860's. 53 In
1871, the movement succeeded in obtaining congressional enactment of a rider to an appropriation bill, authorizing (though
not requiring) the President to prescribe rules for admission
into the civil service. 54 President Grant immediately implemented the bill by appointing a Civil Service Commission. 55 The
Commission lasted only three years, however, because Congress
was unwilling to provide money to support it and the President
was willing to let the matter drop.5 6 Efforts to create a permanent civil service system remained unsuccessful until after the
assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed office
seeker in 1881; the momentum created by the assassination con57
tributed to the passage of the Pendleton Act of 1883.
The cornerstone of the Pendleton Act was the provision
concerning open competitive examinations for entrance into the
public service. 58 The Act did not require the President to appoint people according to examination results; he was authorized merely to request the help of the Civil Service Commission (rather than a political machine) to screen candidates for
public jobs. He could apply the civil service rules where he saw
fit.5 9 The most striking fact about the Pendleton Act, however,
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 276-77 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
note 29, at 65-67.
54 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 114, § 9, 16 Stat. 514.
55 Many of the rules adopted by the Commission continue today to be the foundation 56
of the Civil Service System. VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 69-70.
52

" VAN RIPER, supra

Id. 71.

'7 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403; see VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 89-94.
58 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403.
'9 The permissive nature of the Act was probably a result of the 1871 opinion of
Attorney General Akerman that any restriction on the President's discretion in appointment would be unconstitutional. Akerman reasoned that the Constitution gave the
President power to "appoint" and thereby required him to exercise judgment and discretion. If Congress required the President to appoint an individual selected by a process designed by a Civil Service Commission, the President's appointing power would be
unconstitutionally denied him. 13 Op. Arr'y GEN. 516 (1871); see VAN RIPER, supra note
29, at 106-07; Kaufman, supra note 12, at 38. In fact, the civil service selection provisions of the Act did not adopt the merit system exclusively. They provided for apportioning offices among the states on the basis of population, gave preference to veterans
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was that it did not restrict the President's general power to remove employees. 6° Congress thought it unnecessary to reopen
the longstanding constitutional struggle over Congress' ability to
limit the President's removal power. If civil service restrictions
prevented the President from appointing a hand-picked replacement for a person he removed, his incentive to remove for
political reasons would disappear. 61 Moreover, even the most
vigorous defenders of the civil service concept felt that a limit on
the removal power would be unwise. George William Curtis, the
foremost advocate of civil service reform and the Chairman of
Grant's Civil Service Commission, 62 argued:
Having annulled all reason for the improper exercise of
the power of dismissal, we hold that it is better to take
the risk of occasional injustice from passion and prejudice, which no law or regulation can control, than to
seal up incompetency, negligence, insubordination, insolence, and every other mischief in the service, by requiring a virtual trial at law before an unfit or incapable
63
clerk can be removed.
The purpose of civil service reform was to limit the quadrennial
turnover of government resulting from the spoils system; the
reform movement did not otherwise seek to limit the President's
ability to remove employees he considered unfit. Even the Civil
Service Commissioners had no term and could be removed by
64
the President at will.
Coverage under the civil service system grew rapidly, although not always as a result of belief in the principle of merit
selection. 65 By 1896, almost half of the federal service-about
in selection, and limited the number of employees from any particular family. Act of
Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, §§ 2, 7, 9, 22 Stat. 404, 406.
60 The Act did prohibit removing employees for giving or refusing to give political
contributions. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, § 13, 22 Stat. 407. Otherwise, the Act did
not place any limits on the executive power of removal.
61 ROSENBLOOM, supra note 26, at 87-88; VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 102.
62 VAN RPER, supra note 29, at 69.
63 Quoted in VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 102 (footnote omitted).
64 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, preamble, 22 Stat. 403.
65 The first election after the passage of the Pendleton Act resulted in a victory for
Grover Cleveland, the first Democrat to hold the Presidency in a quarter of a century.
Once the election returns were in, the outgoing President, Chester Arthur, added more
than a thousand positions to the civil service, thus protecting the (Republican) incumbents by limiting the victor's incentive to remove them. This process of "covering in"
employees to protect patronage incumbents after the election, thereby limiting the flexibility of future Presidents but not of the outgoing incumbent, was the major factor in
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the limit reformers had thought possible under a merit
system-was under civil service protection. 66 Moreover, the Civil
Service Commission recognized that unjustified removals had
largely disappeared within the classified civil service, while they
remained substantial in the unclassified federal service. 67 But
beginning in 1887, the Commission sought a presidential order
requiring that the reason for removal be specified and made
68
part of the record of the department making the removal.
Such a requirement, it thought, would further deter unjustified
political removals. President Cleveland refused to issue such an
order, 69 but on July 27, 1897, President McKinley not only did
so, but went further, directing that "[n]o removal shall be made
from any position subject to competitive examination except
for just cause and upon written charges filed with the head of
the department or other appointing officer, and of which the
accused shall have full notice and an opportunity to make de70
fense."
The Civil Service Commission did not intend that the addition to the civil service concept that removal be based on "cause"
become a limit on the power of the executive to remove unqualified employees. Rather it saw the Executive Order as meaning
merely that the executive had to have a legitimate, non-political
reason for removal. 7 1 The Commission recognized, however,
that the provision could be interpreted to mean that a trial
would be necessary to determine the existence of "cause." The
Commission opposed this interpretation, arguing that "to require this would not only involve enormous labor, but would
give a permanence of tenure in the public service quite inconsistent with the efficiency of that service. ' 72 It therefore recommended to President Roosevelt, himself a former Civil Service
Commissioner, 73 that the rule be clarified. On May 29, 1902,
Roosevelt issued a clarifying Executive Order:
the doubling of the coverage of the Civil Service in the first decade of the Pendleton
Act. Cleveland, however, made a major extension of Civil Service coverage during the
RIPER, supra note 29, at 117-18, 122.
course
66 of his second term. VAN
Id. 126, 130.
67 13 U.S. CIv. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 19 (1897).
68 15 U.S. CIv. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 19 (1899).
69

Id.

70Quoted in 14 U.S. CiV. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 24 (1898).
71 19 U.S. CiV. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 18-19 (1902).
72

Id.18.

'3VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 124 n.18; see A. SAGESER, THE FIRST Two DECADES
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Now, for the purpose of preventing all such misunderstandings and improper constructions of said section,
it is hereby declared that the term 'just cause," as used
in section 8, Civil Service Rule II, is intended to mean
any cause, other than one merely political or religious,
which will promote the efficiency of the service; and
nothing contained in said rule shall be construed to require the examination of witnesses or any trial or hearing except in the discretion of the officer making the
74
removal.
Although Roosevelt later sought to reduce the protection the
Orders had given to civil servants, 75 President Taft issued an
Executive Order in 1912 reaffirming the two original Orders. 7 6
In its annual report of 1912, the Civil Service Commission
explained why the Taft Executive Order continued to require
only notice and a right to reply, and not a trial, prior to an
employee removal:
The rules are not framed on a theory of life tenure,
fixed permanence, nor vested right in office. It is recognized that subordination and discipline are essential,
and that therefore dismissal for just cause shall be not
unduly hampered ....

Appointing officers, therefore,

are entirely free to make removals for any reasons relating to the interests of good administration, and they
are made the final judges of the sufficiency of the
reasons....
...The rule is merely intended to prevent removals upon secret charges and to stop political pressure for
removals ....

No tenure of office is created except that

based upon efficiency and good behavior; and it remains as much the duty of an appointing officer to
remove a classified employee for inefficiency as it is not
OF THE PENDLETON ACT: A STUDY OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 141-43 (1935) (analyzing T.

Roosevelt's performance as a Civil Service Commissioner).
11 Quoted in 19 U.S. CIv. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 76 (1902).
75In 1905, Roosevelt weakened the original Order, making the giving of notice to
discharged employees discretionary, 22 U.S. CIv. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 71 (1905),
but the change made little practical difference, 29 U.S. CiV. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 22
(1913). See note 76 infra & accompanying text.
76 29 U.S. CIV. SERV. Comm'N ANN. RE'. 132-33 (1913). The Order restored the

original rule requiring notice and a right to reply specifying, however, that "no examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of
the officer making the removal." Id. 132.
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him in any way for political or
to discriminate against
77
religious reasons.
Shortly after Taft issued his Executive Order, Congress
began to debate a rider to the Post Office appropriations bill of
1912, which, in part, gave statutory authority to the provisions of
the Executive Order and was phrased in almost identical
words. 78 The final bill, known as the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, was
enacted and signed into law on August 24, 1912. 7 9 This codification of President Taft's Executive Order remains today the governing statute for all removals of employees from the federal
civil service except those of veterans.8 0 Nothing in the legislative
history of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act questioned the unwillingness
reflected in the Executive Order to require the executive to
"prove" he had cause prior to discharging a civil servant. Indeed,
the Act's adoption of the language of prior Executive Orders
specifying that no hearing would be required, thus limiting the
employee's rights to notice and a right to a reply, indicates quite
the contrary. Civil service rules, therefore, continued to prohibit
only certain impermissible grounds for removal and otherwise
allowed the executive to define "cause." 81 The legislative and
77

1d. 21-22.

78 [N]o person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be re-

moved therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said
service and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose removal is
sought shall have notice of the same and of any charges preferred against him,
and be furnished with a copy thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time
for personally answering the same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof;
but no examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required
except in the discretion of the officer making the removal; and copies of
charges, notice of hearing, answer, reasons for removal, and of the order of
removal shall be made a part of the records of the proper department or
office, as shall also the reasons for reduction in rank or compensation; and
copies of the same shall be furnished to the person affected upon request, and
the Civil Service Commission also shall, upon request, be furnished copies of
the same ....
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555.
Congressional debate, however, did not focus on the implications of this removal
procedure, but concentrated instead on reversing the attempts of Presidents Roosevelt
and Taft to allow civil servants to communicate with Congress only through department
heads, the so-called "gag rules." The Senate also sought the protection of the rights of
the employees to organize collectively. 48 CONG. REc. 5625-27, 5632-39, 9952-53,
10670-77, 10728-33 (1912). These matters were specifically covered by provisos. Act of
Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555.
79 Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101,
7102 (1970).
805 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
81 The development of Civil Service Rule XII, concerning removals, is reported in
the Annual Reports of the Civil Service Commission and, more recently, in separately
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executive branches continued to affirm the importance of executive discretion as established by the Decision of 1789, a joint
position broken only by the constitutional crisis over the Tenure
of Office Act of 1867.
Beginning in the early 1930's, however, the Civil Service
Commission began to seek a role in reviewing the discretion exercised by the agencies in employee dismissals and urged the
creation of an appellate process within the Civil Service Commission. 82 No action was taken on this proposal until the passage of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944.83 Section 14 of
the Act 8 4 provided veterans thirty days' notice of any adverse
action against them; afforded them the right of a personal appearance to challenge the action, rather than merely a right to
a written reply as under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912; and,
most importantly, afforded veterans the right to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission "from an adverse decision . . .of an
administrative authority ....*"85 The genesis of this dramatic departure from the historic emphasis on executive discretion is
obscure. The House report on the bill 86 and the very brief

House debate 87 focused solely on the wartime concern with providing adequate employment opportunities for returning veterans and did not explain the need for the procedural changes
made by Section 14. There was no Senate debate on the bill.8 8
Section 14 might be explained, however, simply by the Act's
pervasive emphasis on giving veterans a decisive break in employment opportunities, a break which was too important to be
entrusted to executive discretion. Given the protective legislative
scheme as to hiring, promotion, and layoffs, 89 it is not surprising
issued annual compilations of current Civil Service Rules. See, e.g., 42 U.S" CIv. SERV.
COMM'N ANN. REP. 71 (1925).
82 48 U.S. Civ. SERV. COMM'N ANN. REP. 41 (1931). See Guttman, The Development

and Exercise of Appellate Powers in Adverse Action Appeals, '19 AM. U.L. REv. 323, 332
(1970).
"' Act of June 27, 1944, ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387.
84 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511, 7512, 7701 (1970). The benefits of section 14 are afforded
"preference eligibles" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1974). The term includes, in addition to veterans, the unmarried widows or widowers
of veterans, the wives or husbands of certain disabled veterans, and the mothers of
certain veterans. See also 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1970). I use the term "veteran" in this Article
to include all preference eligibles.
855 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970).
86 H.R. REP. No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
87 90 CONG. REC. 3501-06 (1944).
88
Id.5784-85 (1944).
" To ensure appointment of veterans, the Act first listed a number o'specific ad-
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that an agency's discretion to remove veterans for cause was also
subject to Civil Service Commission review.
Once the veterans' rights to an appellate process were established, however, there seemed to be an incongruity between having a review process for removal of veterans, who constituted
more than fifty percent of the federal civil service, and having
no review process for the remaining federal employees. 90 Some
called for the establishment of a single federal procedure by
extending the principles of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944
to all civil service employees, 9 1 but others preferred making the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act procedures universally applicable. Thus, in
its review of needed reforms in the organization of the federal
government, the second Hoover Commission called for a return
to the provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, criticizing
the procedures under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference
Act. That section, said the Commission, "creates serious problems for management, unduly hampers operations, and . . .
produce[s] quite the opposite of good employer-employee relationships." 9
Shortly after assuming office, President Kennedy appointed
a task force to establish a policy for employee-management
cooperation in the federal service which would deal with a
number of problems of federal government employees, including the right to appellate review of adverse actions. The committee recommended that the President extend the Veterans' Preference Act rights to all civil service employees. 93 On January 17,
vantages afforded them: It augmented their earned ratings for appointment by a specified amount to ensure advantage over otherwise equal non-veterans, Act of June 27,
1944, ch. 287, § 3, 58 Stat. 388; it specified the type of experience for which they were
to receive credit toward appointment, id. § 4; it mandated the waiving of nonessential
age, height, and weight requirements for them only, id. § 5. The Act then went on
to require that veterans be placed at the top of the list in accordance with their augmented ratings, id. § 7, and that a statement in writing be made of the reasons any
non-veteran was selected over an eligible veteran, with the Civil Service Commission
directed to determine the sufficiency of such reasons, id. § 8. To ensure that veterans
were protected from layoffs, the Act required that any veteran whose efficiency rating
was good or better had to be retained in preference to all other employees, and that
veterans whose efficiency ratings were below good had to be retained in preference to
all other employees of equal or lower rating, id. § 12.
90See H.R. REP. No. 1844, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46, 58 (1956); H.R. REP. No.
1759, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1954); S. Doc. No. 33, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1953).
91 H.R. REP. No. 1759, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1954); S. Doc. No. 33, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 26 (1953).
92 U.S. COMMISSION ON OIRGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,

supra note 16, at 68.

9' PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
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1962, President Kennedy issued an Executive Order establishing
a system of appeals within each agency for review of adverse
actions and requiring that the appellate process provide a hearing to the employee. 94 President Nixon supplemented this procedure with a right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission
itself, thereby giving non-veterans the same rights veterans had
under the Veterans' Preference Act. 95 On June 11, 1974, President Nixon made appeal to the Civil Service Commission the
sole possible appeal, revoking the agency review process established by President Kennedy.9 6 The right of every civil servant to
an outside appraisal of the grounds for dismissal has thus recently replaced the historic emphasis on executive discretion.
C.

The Role of the Courts

1. Prior to Bailey v. Richardson
Until the 1950's the courts consistently refused to review
challenges to the executive's power to remove employees. This
refusal has often been attributed to a "doctrine of privilege," the
notion that the government has unlimited power over its employees because government employment is a privilege and not
a right. 9 7 In fact, the doctrine of privilege has not been the basis for denying judicial relief to affected employees, at least in
the federal courts. Rather, the United States Supreme Court
has relied on three other doctrines: that the power to remove
employees is inherent in and necessary to the constitutional
grant of executive authority; that one legislature cannot bind
another in defining the nature of executive positions; and that
SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
24 (1961).
14 Exec. Order No. 10,987, 3 C.F.R. 519 (Comp. 1959-1963), 5 U.S.C. § 7501
(1970). For a discussion of the impact 9f this order, see Berzak, Rights Accorded Federal
Employees Against Whom Adverse Personnel Actions Are Taken, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 853
(1972).
95 Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 22, 3 C.F.R. 266 (1974), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
96 Exec. Order No. 11,787, 3A C.F.R. 151 (1974), 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. IV,
1974).
97 See, e.g., ROSENBLOOM, supra note 26, at 16; Comment, Fear of Firing: Arnett v.
Kennedy and the Protection of FederalCareerEmployees, 10 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L.

REv. 472, 478 (1975). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). The doctrine stems from Justice Holmes' famous epigram, "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
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the kind of issues that arise in employment disputes are not
proper subjects for judicial resolution.
The judicial conception of the importance of employee removals to the exercise of executive power has been the principal
basis for the refusal to overturn employee discharges. In 1839,
the Supreme Court first dealt with an employee dismissal in Ex
parte Hennen,98 a case concerning a judicial, not an executive,
employee. The Court upheld the right of a district court judge
to remove his clerk in order to replace him with an old friend.
Although the statute creating the office of clerk did not expressly provide a power of removal, Congress had expressed no intention that clerks would serve for life. In light of the constitutional and congressional silence, the Court reasoned that "it
would seem to be a sound and necessary rule, to consider the
power of removal as incident to the power of appointment." 99
Since life tenure would not be assumed, the discretion of the
appointing officer could be the only basis for removal, leaving
no role in the removal process for the courts.
Some sixty years later, in Parsons v. United States, 10 0 the
Court upheld the President's right to remove a district attorney
appointed under a statute providing for a four-year term, even
though the removal preceded the expiration of his term. This
case presented the Court with what could be interpreted as an
attempt by Congress to limit the President's removal power by
establishing a fixed term of office. The Court's refusal to interpret the statute as such a limitation was based on two fundamental premises. First, the Court wanted to avoid deciding the question, raised by the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 and the Johnson
impeachment, whether Congress could constitutionally limit the
President's power of removal. Second, the Court's review of the
history of the removal power since the Decision of 1789 suggested that such a power was so important to the exercise of the
executive authority that any attempted limitation would have to
be specified in the clearest possible terms. The Parsons Court
thus interpreted the statute specifying a four-year term as "an
act of limitation not of grant":10 1 The term was established as a
maximum length of service to which the appointee was entitled,
98 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
99

Id.at 259.
100167 U.S. 324 (1897).
101 Id.

at 338.
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allowing the President to remove the appointee earlier, at his
10 2
pleasure.
The Parsons approach had its broadest application in Shurtleff v. United States,'0 3 in which the Court upheld the President's
removal of a general appraiser without specified reasons despite
a statute that provided that appraisers "may be removed from
office at any time by the President for inefficiency, neglect of
"104 The Court, refusing to
duty, or malfeasance in office ....
consider congressional specification of the reasons for removal
as a limit on the President's ability to remove at his pleasure,
strained to find a reason supporting such a result. It interpreted
the statute as an attempt to make clear that a removal for unspecified reasons would create a conclusive presumption that the
removal was not for any of the causes named in the statute, and
therefore could not be regarded as based upon the employee's
05
integrity or capacity.'
In 1926, the Supreme Court was squarely faced with the
question it sought to avoid in Parsons and Shurtleff: Was the
Decision of 1789 giving the President the sole power to remove
his appointees merely a matter of legislative choice by the First
Congress, subject to reversal by a later Congress, or was it constitutionally compelled? In Myers v. United States,' °6 a postmaster,
removed from office by action of the Postmaster General, sued
for his salary from the date of his removal. He argued that his
removal was illegal under the 1876 Act creating his office, which
provided that he could be appointed and removed only "by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate."'0 7 The Court re102Similarly, in Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 (1901), the Court upheld the
removal of a commissioner in the Indian Territory by the court that had appointed him
when the statute provided that commissioner could be removed "for causes prescribed
by law." Id. at 424. Although neither the executive nor Congress had specified any such
causes, the Court, citing Hennen and Parsons, held that a removal without specification
of any cause was proper because the statute could not have been intended to limit the
power of removal incident to the power of appointment.
103 189 U.S. 511'(1903).

104Act ofJune 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 136; see 189 U.S. at 313.
105 189 U.S. at 317.

A removal for [the causes listed in the statute] can only be made after notice
and an opportunity to defend, and therefore, if a removal is made without
such notice, there is a conclusive presumption that the officer was not removed
for any of those causes, and his removal cannot be regarded as the least imputation on his character for integrity or capacity.
Id.
106 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

107Act ofJuly 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 81.
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jected the postmaster's argument, holding that the sole executive
power of removal could not be limited by Congress.
The opinion, written by Chief Justice (and former President) Taft, relied heavily on Madison's arguments for presidential authority to remove made at the time of the Decision of
1789.108 The power of removal, the Court reasoned, was inherently an executive power, not a legislative or judicial function.
The Constitution by its terms limits the requirement of Senate
concurrence to appointments, because a limitation on removals
would be a much greater restriction on presidential power. The
rejection of a nominee enables the Senate to prevent the appointment of a bad person to government and limits the President only by forcing him to select another person entirely of his
own choosing. On the other hand, a Senate rejection of an attempted removal would force the President to retain a person
not of his own choosing. The Constitution was not designed to
give Congress the power, in the case of a political difference with
the President, to thwart his authority "by fastening upon him, as
subordinate executive officers, men who by their inefficient service under him, by their lack of loyalty to the service, or by their
different views of policy, might make his taking care that the
laws be faithfully executed most difficult or impossible."' 0 9
The power to prevent the removal of an officer
who has served under the President is different from
the authority to consent to or reject his appointment.
When a nomination is made, it may be presumed that
the Senate is, or may become, as well advised as to the
fitness of the nominee as the President, but in the nature of things the defects in ability or intelligence or
loyalty in the administration of the laws of one who has
served as an officer under the President, are facts to
which the President, or his trusted subordinates, must
be better informed than the Senate, and the power to
remove him may, therefore, be regarded as confined,
for very sound and practical reasons, to the governmental authority which has administrative control. The
108 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
109272 U.S. at 131. Justice McReynolds, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the facts as well as of the meaning of the Decision of 1789, arguing
that Congress did not intend by its actions to grant unlimited powers to the President to
remove his appointees. Id. at 193-204 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of advising and consenting to
appointment, and when the grant of the executive
power is enforced by the express mandate to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the
necessity for including within the executive power as
conferred the exclusive power of removal. 110
The Court concluded that the congressional attempt to require
Senate concurrence in the removal of postmasters, like the
broader attempt to limit the President's removal power by the
Tenure of Office Act of 1867, was unconstitutional."' The second premise of the Parsons decision, that the power of removal is
inherent in executive power, thus became the answer to the constitutional question the Parsons Court had sought to avoid.
The Myers Court tried to limit its sweeping affirmation of
the sole executive power of removal by relying on the Constitution's distinction between executive officers appointed by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate and those whose
appointment Congress can vest in the executive alone. 1 2 The
Court reasoned that Congress can limit the removal of officers
whose appointment it has vested in the executive alone because
all executive power over those officers was derived in the first
instance from Congress. Thus Congress can condition its grant
of power to the executive on whatever terms it thinks
appropriate. 113 On the other hand, the President's power to appoint officers with the concurrence of the Senate is derived not
from Congress but from the Constitution itself. Congress therefore has no analogous authority to limit the executive power
over these officers." 14 In emphasizing the importance of the ap1 10

d. at 121-22.
n'Id. at 164-72, 176.
112 [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
"1 272 U.S. at 159-61. This reasoning was based on United States v. Perkins, 116
U.S. 483 (1886), in which the Court upheld the power of Congress to condition the
removal of a naval officer-whose appointment Congress vested in the Secretary of the
Navy alone-on a court martial prior to removal.
114 272 U.S. at 163-64.
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pointment process in determining the extent of congressional
power over removals, the Court specifically rejected the notion
that the congressional power always exists where the office is an
inferior one. 115 As Madison recognized in 1789, the concept of
responsiveness to executive authority must be accepted through
the entire spectrum of those exercising that authority. 1 6 The
President cannot govern by controlling his Cabinet alone; they
too must control their departments to be able to carry out the
President's decisions.
The Court's own emphasis on the importance of the removal power to executive authority, however, undermines its
reliance on the appointment process as the test of determining
the power of Congress over removals. As the Court itself acknowledged, its reasoning would seem to allow Congress to gain
control of the removal process simply by vesting sole power of
appointment in the executive.' 1 7 A strong argument can be
made that this weakening of executive power is not constitutionally compelled. As with appointments made with the Senate's
concurrence, the constitutional provision giving Congress authority to vest sole appointment power in the executive refers
only to appointments and not to removals. The section on its
face allows Congress to choose to participate or not to participate
in the appointment process for inferior officers; it does not authorize Congress to interfere in the executive personnel process
in any other way. If the removal power is truly executive in
nature, as the Court argued, it seems no less so because Congress
" Id. at 158-61. Even though the Constitution grants Congress the authority to
vest the power of appointment for "inferior offices," note 112 supra, and the position of
postmaster seems inferior in the overall scheme of governmental power, the Court held
that congressional participation in the appointment process for that office classified it as
one appointed "by and with the advise and consent of the Senate" and thereby prevented Congress from limiting the President's power of removal.
The Court's reliance on the appointment process enabled it to suggest how the
Civil Service System was constitutionally valid. Any congressional limitation on removals under a Civil Service System would be constitutional, the Court said, as long as it did
not apply to officials appointed with the concurrence of the Senate. 272 U.S. at 173-74.
116See text accompanying note 25 supra. Having rejected the argument of the majority that control over subordinates is necessary to executive authority, dissenting Justices McReynolds and Brandeis argued that the appropriate factor in ascertaining the
scope of the executive power is whether the office was a superior or inferior one, and,
without deciding the extent of the power of the President to remove a Cabinet officer,
said that the removal of a postmaster so clearly involved an inferior office that congressional limitation on his removal did not violate legitimate executive authority. 272 U.S.
at 187, 241.
17 The Court refused to decide whether its reasoning led to such a result, although
it conceded that it was "difficult to avoid a negative answer." 272 U.S. at 162.
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vests the appointment power solely in the executive branch.
The Myers Court's attempt to classify the extent of the
President's removal power in terms of the appointment process
did not last long. Nine years later, in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 1 8 the Supreme Court disapproved Myers" broad
proposition that no congressional restriction on the President's removal power would be constitutional for officials appointed with the advice and the consent of the Senate. Faced
with the President's removal of a Federal Trade Commissioner,
the Court held that the President's power to remove such a
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officer can be restricted
by Congress. It limited the Myers holding to purely executive officers, but stated that such an officer is "inherently
subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removable by
the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is." 1 9 Humphrey's Executor leaves unsettled whether the appointment process remains the test for determining which executive officers
are subject to an unrestrictable presidential power of removal.
Clearly, however, at least at some level, the executive power of
removal for executive officers remains so essential that it cannot
constitutionally be limited. Even below that level, the assertions
in Parsons and subsequent cases about the relationship of the
power of removal to the efficient administration of government
remain unquestioned in the federal courts.
The second line of cases denying judicial relief to government employees challenging removals or other adverse actions
is based on a concern for legislative flexibility in creating executive offices. The Supreme Court has sought to protect the
power of succeeding legislatures to reform the government
structure by allowing the modification or abolition of executive
positions. It thus enunciated the proposition that statutory
terms of employment do not themselves create contract or
property rights and therefore can be altered by a later statutory
amendment.
The leading case supporting this proposition is Butler v.
Pennsylvania. 2 0 In Butler, the Court rejected a state official's
118295 U.S. 602 (1935).
119Id. at 627. Humphrey's Executor was followed in Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349 (1958), which, while limiting the presidential power of removal over the War
Claims Commission, a quasi-judicial body, supported the Myers doctrine of sole presidential power of removal over purely executive officers.
120 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402 (1850).
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claim that he was entitled to the statutory per diem amount
specified at the time of his appointment rather than the lower
amount provided by a statutory amendment passed during his
term of office. The Court noted that if the official's right to a
salary were considered a contract, "the government would have
to become one great pension establishment on which to quarter a
host of sinecures."' 121 The Butler case was followed by Crenshaw v.
United States,12 2 in which the Court rejected a claim by a cadet
midshipman that he was entitled to an appointment as a midshipman under the statute as it existed at the time of his enlistment despite a legislative reversal of policy during his time as a
cadet. The Court upheld the cadet's discharge, rejecting his
claim of contract rights and stating rather broadly: "He enjoys a
privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will; and one legislature
1' 2 3
cannot deprive its successor of the power of revocation."
The Supreme Court has sought subsequently, though not
altogether successfully, to distinguish between legislative creation
of terms of employment for government officials, which a subsequent legislature can change at will, and its creation of a government contractual obligation with an employee, which cannot
constitutionally be altered by later legislative action.124 In Hall v.
Wisconsin, 125 the Court held that once legislation had authorized
the hiring of a commissioner to make a geological survey under
a written contract with the governor, the surveyor's contract
could not be terminated by the repeal of the authorizing legislation. The Court emphasized that the legislature had specifically
required a written contract with the surveyor, thus distinguishing the case from an attempt to abolish a public office. "It would
121Id. at 416. The Court added:
[T]he appointment to and the tenure of an office created for the public use,
and the regulation of the salary affixed to such an office, do not fall within the
[contract clause]; do not come within the import of the term contracts, or, in
other words, the vested, private personal rights thereby intended to be protected. They are functions appropriate to that class of powers and obligations
by which governments are enabled, and are called upon, to foster and promote
the general good; functions, therefore, which governments cannot be presumed to have surrendered, if indeed they can under any circumstances be
justified in surrendering them.
Id. at 417.
122 134 U.S. 99 (1890).
123 Id. at 108. Cf. Higginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1939).
124Compare Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937), and Phelps v. Board of
Educ., 300 U.S. 319 (1937), with Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, S03 U.S. 95 (1938).
See also id. at 113-17 (Black, J., dissenting).
125 103 U.S. 5 (1880).
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be a novel and startling doctrine ... that the government might
discard . . . [employees] at pleasure, because their respective
employments were public offices, and hence without the protec12 7
tion of contract rights.1126 In Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,
the Court held unconstitutional Indiana's repeal of the teacher
tenure law under which the petifioner had gained tenure. The
Court found that the tenure law specifically created an indefinite
contractual right of employment once the -necessary length of
service was completed, and that such a contract could not be
terminated by a subsequent legislative decision to abolish the
policy of tenure. The Court cautioned, however, that there is a
limit to the government's ability to bind itself contractually. At
some point, an attempt to limit by contract a future government's flexibility in changing terms of employment would violate
public policy. The Court emphasized that in this case the government had not ceded its necessary flexibility, because the
grounds for the discharge of tenured teachers-incompetence, a
justifiable decrease in the number of teaching positions, or
"other good and just cause"-were very broad indeed. 128
Thus even the cases finding the creation of constitutionally
protected contract rights recognize the importance of legislative flexibility to modify employment terms or discharge unneeded employees. Preventing one legislature from irreparably
binding succeeding generations through the creation of executive positions allows the removals and revisions essential to the
continuing reformation of the government service.
The third line of cases in which the Court has refused to
review removals of government employees is based on the notion
that these questions are administrative and not judicial in nature.
In Keim v. United States,'2 9 the Secretary of the Interior had discharged a civil servant on the ground of inefficiency. The employee objected that retained employees had not been shown
to possess better capacity to do their jobs and that he had in
fact performed his job efficiently. The Court, citing Hennen and
Parsons as upholding the inherent power of removal, 30 went
beyond those cases to say that such a dismissal is beyond the
review of the courts.
d. at 10.
303 U.S. 95 (1938).
128 Id. at 107-08.
129 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
130 Id. at 294.
12r

127
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[I]f courts should not be called upon to supervise the
results of a civil service examination equally inappropriate would be an investigation of the actual work
done by the various clerks, in comparison of one with
another as to competency, attention to duty, etc. These
are matters peculiarly within the province of those who
are in charge of and superintending the departments,
and until Congress by some special and direct legislation makes provision to the contrary, we are clear that
13 1
they must be settled by those administrative officers.
Most of the development of the Keim doctrine has occurred
in lower courts. For example, in United States ex rel. Taylor v.
Taft,'3 2 the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held that
it had no jurisdiction to review the Secretary of War's dismissal
of a clerk who had written a critical article about the President.
The employee objected that the procedure mandated by President McKinley's Executive Order 1 33 had not been followed, but
the Court rejected any judicial role in reviewing the basis of
executive removals, stating that "[a]ny other conclusion would
encourage inefficiency and incompetency in office, and be fruitful of insubordination. 1 3 4
From Bailey v. Richardson to
Board of Regents v. Roth
Given the unbroken line of cases upholding the importance
of the removal power to the executive, the essential nature of
legislative flexibility in creating and altering the terms of government employment, and the administrative nature of the
questions underlying employee dismissals, one can understand
Judge Prettyman's surprise at the boldness of the contention
2.

,31Id. at 295-96.
13224 App. D.C. 95 (Sup. Ct. 1904), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 461 (1906).
133 See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
13424 App. D.C. at 99. Lower federal courts consistently rejected the notion that

the Executive Orders limiting the removal power or the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912
gave any power to the courts to review the evidence or the substance of the reasons for
employee dismissal. Despite employees' allegations of innocence, the courts routinely
rejected their claims as failing to state a cause of action. See, e.g., Levy v. Woods, 171
F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222 (1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 848 (1947); Levine v. Farley, 107 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 622 (1940); Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 682, cert. denied, 292 U.S. 643
(1934); Page v. Moffett, 85 F. 38 (C.C.D.N.J. 1898). For a discussion of whether the
fundamental proposition of Keim-that the question of employee competence is not a
proper judicial question-remains valid, see Part III infra.
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made in Bailey v. Richardson1 35 that the Constitution required a
certain procedure before Ms. Bailey could be discharged from
government employment for being disloyal to the United
States. She challenged her dismissal on a number of statutory
grounds, but did not herself raise the constitutional issue; that
issue was raised by disagreement within the panel of the court
of appeals.' 36 Judge Prettyman referred to the unbroken 160year history of refusing to grant judicial hearings to government employees and to the Civil Service Act itself, which specifically denied the need for a hearing. If a hearing were to be
constitutionally required for Ms. Bailey, he reasoned, the entire
history of cases would have to be overruled, and the LloydLaFollette Act itself declared unconstitutional. 37 Although
Judge Prettyman referred to the Holmes concept of privilege, 38 the history of the federal cases was the primary basis for
his rejection of any constitutional claim.
Yet Judge Edgerton, dissenting in Bailey, emphasized that
he did not seek to reopen the history of employment dismissal
cases, for this, he said, was not a normal dismissal.
Most dismissals, including among others dismissals for
colorless or undisclosed reasons and dismissals for incompetence, are plainly not punitive. They do not require a judicial trial or even a full administrative hearing. They are within the authority of the executive....
It does not follows [sic] that ... all executive dismissals
39
are constitutional.
Here Ms. Bailey was discharged for exercising what she claimed
to be her constitutional rights of free speech and assembly and
was punished with the most serious label of disloyalty.' 40 One
135 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiain by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
136 Id. at 55.
37

1

Id. at 56-58.

1:s Id. at 59.
139
Id. at 69.
140 Judge Edgerton argued that Ms. Bailey's discharge for disloyalty was, unlike a
normal dismissal, a form of punishment. This argument was based on United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), in which the Supreme Court struck down as an unconstitutional bill of attainder a congressional specification not to pay the salary of three named
individuals, thus permanently barring them from public employment. The Court said
in Lovett that "[tihis permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and of a most severe type." Id. at 316. But because Ms. Bailey
was subject only to removal, and not to a permanent bar to future employment (a
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need not question the government's ability to discharge employees routinely without a hearing, he argued, in order to believe it appropriate to place limits upon the government's ability
to discharge employees for exercising constitutional rights. Although Judge Edgerton's attempt in Bailey to create some protection for the exercise of constitutional rights in government
employment was unsuccessful, it formed the basis for a series of
succeeding cases, beginning with Wieman v. Updegraff,a4 1 that
began to protect those rights.
The Supreme Court's first limitation on the executive power
of removal, imposed in Wieman, was a narrow one. Two factors
combined to justify the Court's striking down a state attempt to
discharge individuals solely for innocent membership in certain
organizations: The activity causing the removal was encompassed by the constitutionally protected freedom of association 4 2 and the infringement of the constitutionally protected
freedom was not necessary to achieve legitimate government
objectives, but was "an assertion of arbitrary power.' 1 43 This
concept-that the government cannot dismiss employees for reasons not relevant to their employment, under circumstances
where the activity objected to is constitutionally protected-is a
very limited restriction on the executive power of removal,
and subsequent cases have made clear that both these factors
must be found before an executive removal will be invalidated.' 44 The legitimacy of the right of removal, as articulated in
Parsons1 45 and Myers146 depends upon the needs of the executive
to manage his work force. Requiring that serving these needs be
shown before constitutional liberties of employees can be limited
limited bar was attempted but struck down as unauthorized by statute), Lovett was
found distinguishable by the majority. See 182 F.2d at 55.
141 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
142 See, e.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 680 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 519 (1958).
143 344 U.S. at 191. Thus, the broad statement in Wieman that "constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory," id. at 192, widely hailed as the end of the concept of
privilege, is limited in its context to an exclusion that raises serious constitutional questions of freedom of association without adequate justification in terms of governmental
objectives.
144 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Slochower v. Board
of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
145 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897). See text accompanying notes
100-02 supra.
146 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See text accompanying notes 106-17
Supra.
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seems a modest protection of constitutional rights. Moreover,
nothing in such a doctrine violates Keim v. United States147 by
turning the issue of an employee's competence into a judicial
rather than an administrative question. Wieman is a substantive
requirement for
limit on the removal power, not a procedural
1 48
power.
that
of
exercise
legitimate
the
The limited nature of the incursion on executive power
made in Wieman is demonstrated by subsequent cases that have
limited the executive removal power because of infringement of
constitutional rights. In Slochower v. Board of Education, 4 9 the
Supreme Court struck down as arbitrary a New York City charter provision mandating the termination of a city employee who
invoked the fifth amendment. Having found that this prohibition covered every city employee who invoked the fifth amendment, regardless of reasons, the Court went on to note that the
invocation .of the fifth amendment in the instant case was not
relevant to the job performance of the individual: "The State has
broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees,
and it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's conof the
tinued employment to be inconsistent with a real5 interest
°
State. But there has been no such inquiry here."'
Similarly, in Pickering v. Board of Education,15' the Court invalidated the dismissal of a high school teacher for writing a
letter to the local newspaper criticizing the school board's handling of a bond issue. While stating that the teacher could not
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish his first amendment
rights as a public employee, the Court went on to say:
147 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
148The Court momentarily seemed to suggest otherwise in Connell v. Higgin-

botham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), ihen it said that the use of an impermissible oath "falls
within the ambit of decisions of this Court proscribing summary dismissal from public
employment without hearing or inquiry required by due process." Id. at 208. Yet the
following year, in Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972), the Court made clear that
Connell did not mean that a hearing was required in every discharge case:
All of the cases in this Court that require a hearing before discharge for failure to take an oath involved impermissible oaths .... [In Connell] the Court
held only that the mere refusal to take the particular oath was not a constitutionally permissible basis for termination. In the circumstances . . . only by
holding a hearing, showing evidence of disloyalty, and allowing the employee
an opportunity to respond might the State develop a permissible basis for concluding that the employee was to be discharged.
Id. at 686.
149350 U.S. 551 (1956).
0
5 Id. at 559.
151391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive
at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
15 2
through its employees.
The Court pointed out that Pickering did not involve the maintaining of discipline by an immediate superior, the harmony
among co-workers, or the relationship of trust and confidence
necessary to the proper functioning of the school. Nor was it a
case in which the teacher's statements impeded his ability to perform his job or called into question his ability to do so.' 53 Like
Wieman, Pickering presented both the exercise of a constitutional
right and the discharge of an individual for that exercise when
the discharge was irrelevant to his performance of his duties.
The fact of relevance distinguishes Civil Service Commission v.
Letter Carriers154 from Pickering; in Letter Carriers, the Court reaffirmed its position in United Public Workers v. Mitchell1 55 and
upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition against federal
employees' taking "an active part in political management or in
political campaigns."'1 56 The Court noted that the restriction on
political freedom was part of the legitimate government effort to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government
57
service.'
In 1961, the Supreme Court made clear that no specific
procedures were required in a discharge case that did not involve the exercise of constitutional rights. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,' 58 Rachel Brawner, an employee who worked in a government facility for a government
contractor, was excluded from her job by the government's
summary determination that she was a security risk. The Court
152 Id. at 568.
153 Id. at 573 n.5.
154

413 U.S. 548 (1973).

155 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
156413 U.S. at 550.
157 See id. at 564-65.
158 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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denied the employee's claim that the Constitution required a
hearing prior to her denial of a security clearance. In language
quoted frequently, the Court said:
The Fifth Amendment does not require a trial-type
hearing in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest... . "'[D]ue process,' unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." It is "compounded of history, reason, the past
course of decisions ......
As these and other cases make clear, consideration
of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been
159
affected by governmental action.
The Court then turned to the nature of the governmental interest in question in the case at hand:
This case . . . involves the Federal Government's dispatch of its own internal affairs. The Court has consistently recognized that an interest closely analagous to
Rachel Brawner's, the interest of a government employee in retaining his job, can be summarily denied. It
has become a settled principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be revoked
6
at the will of the appointing officer.1 0
The Court went on to distinguish the claim for procedural due
process from Wieman v. Updegraff:
But to acknowledge that there exist constitutional restraints upon state and federal governments in dealing
with their employees is not to say that all such employees have a constitutional right to notice and a hearing before they can be removed. We may assume that
Rachel Brawner could not constitutionally have been
excluded from the Gun Factory if the announced
grounds for her exclusion had been patently arbitrary
or discriminatory .... It does not follow, however, that
she was entitled to notice and a hearing when the
159 Id. at 894-95 (footnotes omitted).
160 Id. at 896 (footnotes omitted).
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reason advanced for her exclusion was, as here, entirely
rational .... 161
The Court noted that the denial of a security pass could mean
simply that Miss Brawner was garrulous or careless with her
badge, and had itself no implication of disloyalty. 162 The Court
clearly implied that had it been alleged that the employee was
garrulous, she would have had no right to a hearing to determine whether or not that charge was true, and, if true, whether
16 3
it constituted sufficient grounds for dismissal.
Thus the history of the Supreme Court's opinions prior to
Board of Regents v. Roth, 164 like that of the civil service reform
movement prior to the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944,165 is
not based on any attempt to make the superior "prove" his case
against an employee prior to dismissal. The Court and the Congress agreed that the termination decision was for the executive
to make unless the removal was for an impermissible reason,
such as the exercise of constitutional rights or the nature of the
employee's political beliefs. An allegation that the grounds for
removal were mistaken, would not, by itself, necessitate a trialtype hearing.
Beginning with the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, and
confirmed by President Kennedy's Executive Order of 1962,166
the Congress and the President began to question the wisdom of
relying on executive discretion in employee discharges. Job security in the civil service, a concept rejected by the Decision of
1789 but implemented before Jackson's expansion of the spoils
system, has reappeared in government service as a consequence
of required evidentiary hearings prior to discharge. Like the
Tenure of Office Act of 1867, these changes attempt to limit
161

Id. at 898.

162Id.

at 899. It may be, however, that Ms. Brawner now would have a protected
liberty interest under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See text accompanying notes 212-15 infra.
163 Even the four dissenters did not say that a judicial trial would be necessary but
only that she was entitled to some process. 367 U.S. at 900. At least in the cases where a
security risk designation means something very odious, they said, the employee is entitled to be told in detail the reasons for her denial so that she can defend her innocence
"in order to show, perhaps, that the true reason for deprivation was one forbidden by
the Constitution." Id. at 901.
164 408 U.S. 546 (1972).
165 Act of June 27, 1944, ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387. See text accompanying notes 53-82
suprna.
166 Exec. Order No. 10,987, 3 C.F.R. 519 (Comp. 1959-1963), 5 U.S.C. § 7501

(1970).
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what appears to be excessive executive authority over his appointees. If the executive or the legislature were to decide to modify
these recent efforts to establish a judicial process for determining employee competence, the question would arise whether
they can still do so-whether, in other words, the present system
is now constitutionally mandated under Board of Regents v.

1 69
68
Roth,' 6 7 Perry v. Sindermann,' and Arnett v. Kennedy.

III.

ROTH, SINDERMANN, AND ARNETT

A. What the Cases Hold
Roth and Sindermann brought an end to the Supreme
Court's consistent rejection of a judicial role in establishing
minimum procedures to be followed before an employee dismissal. So sudden was the break with the past that no opinion
in either case-and only one of the five opinions in Arnett v.
Kennedy that followed them' 7 0-even bothered to cite the history
of cases dealing with government employee removals. Perhaps
the omission in Roth and Sindermann of references to the earlier
line of cases stems from the fact that both cases dealt with state,
not federal, employee actions, although some of the prior cases
dealt with state dismissals as well.' 7 In any event, the results of
Roth and Sindermann were so sweeping that most of the Court in
Arnett treated the history of consideration of the employeeremoval issue as if it began with these cases. It is therefore important to determine the precise effect these cases have had on
the capacity of government to determine the procedures and the
grounds for removing its employees.
Both Roth and Sindernann concerned teachers whose contracts were not renewed by their boards of regents. Both
teachers alleged that the reason for their not being retained was
their exercise of constitutionally protected free speech. In Roth,
the Court did not reach the free speech question because the
district court had stayed proceedings on that issue;' 72 in
167

408 U.S. 564 (1972).

168 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

169
416 U.S. 134 (1974).
0
17 Id. at 181-82 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
"' See, e.g., Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Williams
v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586 (1898); Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402
(1850). Arnett dealt with a dismissal of a federal employee.
172 408 U.S. at 574.
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Sindermann, the Court found a bona fide constitutional claim,
and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on
that issue.' 7 3 As they were presented, therefore, Roth and Sindermann could readily have been decided on the familiar ground
of the post-Wieman cases, notably Pickering v. Board of Education,' 7 4 that constitutionally protected speech is an impermissible ground for discharge (and presumably for nonrenewal) if
the curb on protected activity is unnecessary for ensuring effective job performance.

The Roth Court addressed the issues more broadly, however, because it seemed to reject (or at least ignore) the previously accepted judicial deference given the executive's decisions
to terminate its employees, adopting instead an attitude suspicious of government bureaucracy and its motives. The widespread
and increasing uneasiness about the power and influence of the
government bureaucracy1 75 seemed to demand an emphasis on
individual rights to check and control that bureaucracy's power.
By shifting the focus of concern from the government's needs to
those of the individual, the Court attempted to adjust the balance between public and private interests. Nowhere is this shift
in emphasis more apparent than in Justice Marshall's dissent in
Roth, where he said that, in his view, "every citizen who applies
for a government job is entitled to it unless the government can
establish some reason for denying the employment."'17 6 But establishing the proper balance between the rights of the individual and the needs of the government is peculiarly difficult in
the context of public employment. Too great an emphasis on the
protection of public employees against government dismissals
may reduce the caliber of government employees and thus
weaken the ability of government to function intelligently. A
bureaucracy so constituted may create a serious threat to the
rights of the public at large. The more entrenched the government work force, the less likely it becomes that the public can
receive fair and effective treatment from its government. It is
because of these kinds of concerns that the Court had in the past
173
.74
75

1

408 U.S. at 598.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting);

Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041,
1064-68 (1975); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-80
(1975). See also text accompanying note 2 supra.
176 408 U.S. at 588.
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consistently upheld executive and legislative flexibility in enforcing standards of performance for government employees. Thus
the Court's decision in Roth not only effected a balance between
an individual employee and his organizational employer, but
also, as Madison predicted in 1789,'" affected the balance between the government and its citizens.
In formulating this new position on government employee
removals, the Roth Court first attempted to circumscribe its application. Since every government action affects individuals'
rights, the Court had to adopt some basis for deciding the type
of cases in which the developing notion of procedural due
process 1 7 8 is applicable. The district court in Roth held that the
requirement of affording individuals procedural due process
applies to any case of governmental action, once the balancing of
the governmental and the individual interests is determined to
favor the individual.1 79 The Supreme Court rejected such a
broad notion, stating that the requirement of procedural due
process applies only when an individual's interest in "property"
or "liberty," as protected by the fourteenth amendment, is infringed by the government action.' 80 But the Court's attempt at
limitation proved to be less important than the expansion of the
procedural due process protection engendered by its definitions
of protected "property" and "liberty." Both these definitions may
indicate a complete reversal of the prior 140 years of deference
to executive discretion in employee dismissals in favor of the
protection of individual rights.
The Roth Court said that one would have a "property interest" in a benefit if he had
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is
a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.
It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to
See text accompanying note 25 supra.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (welfare); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment). Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), concerning parole revocation, was decided the same day as Roth and Sindermann.
171 310 F. Supp. 972, 977-79 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
's0 408 U.S. at 571.
177

178E.g.,
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provide 8 an opportunity for a person to vindicate those
claims.1 1
The plaintiff in Roth had "absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment,' ' 82 and thus no protected property
interest. The plaintiff in Sindermann, however, alleged the existence of a de facto tenure system, and the Court held that this
system, if proved, would create a property interest protected by
the fourteenth amendment. 83 One could reason from Sindermann that if the plaintiff there could establish an adequate property interest because of a de facto tenure system, then any government employee whose tenure was protected by civil service
would have "a legitimate claim of entitlement" to his job and
would thus be protected by the fourteenth amendment's requirement of procedural due process before he could be deprived of that property. The concept of property in office,
opposed by proponents of the spoils system and of civil service
reform alike,' 8 4 would thus be created as a constitutional right
Service statute. And so the
simply by the adoption of the Civil
85
Court held in Arnett v. Kennedy.'
In Arnett, the plaintiff was a career civil servant who could
be removed only for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service," pursuant to the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 18 6 Executive
Order 11491,187 and regulations thereunder. 188 He was discharged for, among other reasons, falsely charging a supervisor
with attempted bribery.' 89 Kennedy asserted that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his job under Roth,
and that the procedures provided by the Civil Service statute and
the Executive Order-notice and right to reply prior to dismissal
and a full trial-type hearing only on appeal after dismissal-were
181Id. at 577.

112
Id.at 578.
183408 U.S. at 602-03.
1'84See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
185 416 U.S. 134 (1974).

186 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
1873 C.F.R. 262 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
188E.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201a, .209 (1973) (Civil Service); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1015.7351, -24 (1973) (Office of Economic Opportunity).
189416 U.S. at 137. Regulations of the Office of Economic Opportunity, by which
Kennedy was employed, and of the Civil Service make dishonesty and undermining
public confidence in the agency cause for dismissal. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201a(f), .209
(1973) (Civil Service); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1015.735-1, -24 (1973) (Office of Economic Opportunity).
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unconstitutional. 190 He argued that he had a right to a trial-type
hearing before an impartial hearing officer prior to his removal
from government employment. 19'
Although the five opinions in Arnett represent three, or possibly four, different views about the kinds of procedures constitutionally mandated in employee dismissals,' 9 2 six of the nine
Justices agreed, and the Court thus held, that under Roth civil
servants are given a property interest in their jobs by the LloydLaFollette Act, a property interest that cannot be taken away
without constitutionally imposed procedures. 1 9 3 Justices Powell,
White, and Marshall argued that while it is a legislative decision
whether or not to confer a property interest in a job, once the
legislature does so, the procedure necessary to safeguard that
interest is a matter of constitutional mandate, not legislative
choice. They found that the legislature did intend to confer a
property interest by limiting discharge to "such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service," and thus rejected the
notion that the further legislative proviso that "no examination
of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required" settled
the question of what procedure is constitutionally required to
protect the property interest created.
Only Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality of himself,
the Chief Justice, and Justice Stewart (who had written the majority opinions in Roth and Sindermann), argued against the existence of a constitutionally protected property interest. 1 94 He
,90 416 U.S. at 138-39.
191Id. at 137.
192 See text accompanying notes 221-26 infra.
193 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 185 (White, J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Arnett was not the first

case that suggested such a result. In Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 (1901),
the Court rejected the notion that the power of the United States judges in the Indian

Territory to remove commissioners had been limited by statute, and went on to speculate
about the consequences if there had been specific limitations of the removal power:

If there were, then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are
specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a
fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient.
Id. at 425. But subsequent decisions consistently rejected such a view. In Cafeteria &

Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Court reaffirmed
the "principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appointing officer." Id. at 896. The Court in Roth and Sindermann took the phrase "in absence of legislation" to mean more than merely that the
government must follow legislation if legislation exists, but to mean that if legislation
exists, the Constitution itself provides procedural protection for the individual.
194 416 U.S. at 151-52 (plurality opinion).
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reasoned that since the Lloyd-LaFollette Act provides in the
same section that removal shall be for cause and that the proper
procedure is notice and the right to reply, without trial or
hearing, 195 the plaintiff was "entitled" in the Roth sense to no
more than the statute provided him: cause determined by the
96
procedure specified in the statute.'
To conclude otherwise would require us to hold
that although Congress chose to enact what was essentially a legislative compromise, and with unmistakable
clarity granted governmental employees security against
being dismissed without "cause," but refused to accord
them a full adversary hearing for the determination of
"cause," it was constitutionally disabled from making
such a choice. . . . Neither the language of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor our cases
construing it require any such hobbling restrictions on
1 97
legislative authority in this area.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion has been criticised as an erroneous, "positivist" view of Roth, a view that would destroy the newly
expanded concept of constitutionally mandated procedural due
process. 198 A Roth property right would be worthless, it is argued, if the legislature could establish only a minimum procedure-or no procedure at all-before denying that right. Although the Rehnquist opinion could be read so broadly as to
undermine completely the Roth entitlement concept (and Justice
Marshall in dissent read it this way), 199 it could also be read to
reflect only the situation the Court faced in Arnett, a civil service
discharge. The history of the creation of the combined causeand-no-hearing provisions in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, as shown
earlier, 20 0 demonstrates that those provisions were designed not
merely as an attempt to establish a procedure for determining
the existence of cause, but as a legislative effort to designate
the meaning of "cause." Under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, an
employee's job security is subject to his supervisor's discretion to
discharge him if the supervisor has a bona fide reason to do so,
5 U.S.C. § 7501(a), (b) (1970).
191416 U.S. at 152.
195

"

Id. at 154.

"'See, e.g., Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LiB. L. REV.
269, 277 (1975). But cf. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 87 (1974).
199 416 U.S. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200 See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
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and the supervisor's reason is not subject to second guessing by a
third party without proof of an impermissible ground for the
discharge, such as political allegiance. An employee's "entitlement" before his discharge is not an entitlement to "cause" as
determined by an impartial hearing, but only to a good faith
reason given him by his supervisor. Such a reliance on executive
discretion was not questioned until the enactment of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944201 (which did not apply to Kennedy).10 2 Thus Justice Rehnquist could have been saying simply
that Congress did not intend in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act to
create a property interest in the sense the six Justices suggested,
since one can grasp the meaning of the substantive entitlement
only by reference to the procedure involved.
Not only is the "majority" reading of the legislative history
of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act questionable, its clear finding of a
property right created by the Act runs counter to the entire
history of removal cases. Justice White, the only one who
bothered even to mention that history, is unconvincing in his
attempt to distinguish Hennen, Crenshaw, Parsons, and Keim on
the ground that they arose before the civil service system restricted the executive's power to remove employees. 20 3 The
plaintiffs in these earlier cases, other than Hennen,20 4 would appear to have had what Roth would define as a claim of entitle2 0 5 had a
ment to their jobs. The district attorney in Parsons
four-year appointment to his post; the cadet midshipman in
Crenshaw20 6 was given a statutory right to appointment if the
specified steps were successfully completed; the plaintiff in
Keim 20 7 was a civil servant, protected by the 1897 McKinley Executive Order 20 8 which required, in words similar to the LloydLaFollette Act, that removal be for cause. Similarly, the plaintiff
in Shurtleff20 9 could be removed "for inefficiency, neglect of duty
or malfeasance in office. 2 10 If the plaintiff in Arnett had a property interest in his job, all these plaintiffs did as well. Yet the
201Ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
202 See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
203 416 U.S. at 181-82 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
2 04
Exparte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
205 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
206Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890).
207 Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
208 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
209 Shurtleffv. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
210
Id. at 313.
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reasons these opinions cited for upholding the presidential
power of removal 2 11 went unmentioned in Arnett, as the Court
looked only to Roth to sustain a concept of property in office.
Roth's definition of "liberty" may be an even broader reversal of the history of the removal cases than its definition of
"property." Every government employee, whether or not a civil
servant, is protected against infringement of liberty interests,
while only those with government-created rights have protected
property interests. 1 2 The Roth Court seems to have adopted an
expansive interpretation of "liberty" that encompasses13far more
than the exercise of constitutionally protected rights:
In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed....
There might be cases in which a State refused to
re-employ a person under such circumstances that interests in liberty would be implicated. But this is not
such a case.
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent,
did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract
on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of
dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be
a different case. For "[w]here a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential."...
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in
declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him
a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities.
The State, for example, did not invoke any regulations
211 See text accompanying notes 100-05, 122-23, 129-31 supra.
212 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 572-79 (1972).
213 408 U.S. at 573. The extension of liberty from the earlier concepts of constitutionally protected rights (see, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)) to
broader notions of individual interests had already taken place a year earlier in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). The public posting of an individual's name
as an alcoholic, however, which the Court held in Constantineau required a prior hearing, is a "badge of infamy" considerably more damaging than being discharged from
employment for inefficiency.
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to bar the respondent from all other public employment
in state universities. Had it done so, this, again, would
be a different case.21 4
If the Court was suggesting that any government employee
would have a right to a trial-type hearing if he were discharged
for a reason affecting his good name, it would appear that such a
hearing would be required whenever a reason is given for discharge. If the reason given were sufficient to justify the discharge, let alone to be considered sufficient "cause" for it, it
would inevitably have an adverse effect on future employment
possibilities and thus would encroach upon an employee's liberty interests. Surely a dismissal of an employee for inefficiency, as
in Keim, "might seriously damage his standing and associations in
the community." For those employees not protected from discharge by civil service requirements, the government would, of
course, have the option of dismissing them without giving any
reason, although it would be ironic if Roth, in its effort to
broaden the protection of rights, had the consequence of denying non-civil servants the most basic element of fairness, notice
of the reason for the action taken. The Court attempted to limit
the impact of its definition of liberty by stating that mere proof
that Roth's record of nonretention might make him somewhat
less attractive to future employers would not amount to a deprivation of liberty.2 15 Yet Roth could mean that if a damaging
reason were given for the action, the discharge would have to be
justified to a third-party trier of fact.
If such a definition of "liberty" were established, Congress
would be unable to prevent thejudicialization of the government
employer-employee relationship even if it sought to create an
area of unreviewable supervisory judgment as a basis for dismissal of any government employee. No legislative action could limit
the necessity for a hearing if "liberty" were at stake; an evidentiary trial would be necessary for every employee discharged for
a damaging reason. At least in theory, however, Congress would
retain the power to revise the procedures stemming from the
Roth definition of property simply by eliminating all restrictions
on the power of removal. Yet even that legislative option would
be illusory. If Congress were forced to choose between repealing

214
215

408 U.S. at 572-73 (citations omitted).
Id. at 574 n.13.
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civil service, thereby giving employees no protection from removal at all, or retaining civil service with at least some protection from arbitrary removals, it would of necessity choose the
latter option. In fact, under the Roth-Arnett concept of property,
Congress may no longer have room to maneuver to balance employees' rights and executive flexibility, to find some middle
ground between no protection at all and an evidentiary trial
prior to removal. It could not, for example, require only notice
and the right to reply before dismissal of civil servants, since that
is all the Lloyd-LaFollette Act now requires, 216 and six Justices
found such a limitation inapplicable in Arnett. 217 "The doctrine
of the six Justices thus has the quite significant effect of forcing
the legislature to choose between (a) a non-entitlement regime of
unfettered official choice (as in Roth) and (b) substantive restrictions on official choice accompanied by whatever procedural
rights due process prescribes. '2 18 The Court thus seems to have
rejected the need for legislative flexibility in creating executive
21 9
offices emphasized in the Butler-Crenshaw line of cases.
The issue remains, however, whether the Court, in its efforts
to protect individuals against arbitrary government action, has,
by its interpretation of the due process clause of the Constitution, prohibited in government the system of executive discretion envisioned by the Decision of 1789, carried forward through
the spoils system and the civil service reform movement until
recent times, and upheld by the courts for 140 years. The issue is
not answered by the definitions of liberty and property, because
the establishment of a protected interest is only the first step in
the Roth-Arnett analysis. "Once it is determined that due process
applies, the question remains what process is due. ' 22 0 Perhaps
the Court left itself (along with the President and Congress)
room to protect the public against incompetence in government,
as well as to protect employees against abuse of government
power, when it dealt with the question of the process to be required once a property or liberty interest is found. Indeed, the
Arnett Court seems to have left this vital question open, if only by
2165 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
217 Of course, to the extent that Arnett does not hold the Lloyd-LaFollette Act un-

constitutional, such a balance may still be possible.
2I F. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process at
n.26, 1975 (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of PennsyhaniaLaw Review).
But see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 87 (1974).
210 See text accompanying notes 120-28 supra.
220 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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virtue of its inability to agree on the procedures constitutionally
required prior to dismissing an employee.
Four opinions detail the Court's views on the procedures
required prior to depriving an employee of his property interest
in his job. The Rehnquist plurality opinion can be read to mean
that no process is constitutionally required, but, as noted above,
the opinion might be limited to the context of the LloydLaFollette Act. 22 1 Justice Marshall, in dissent, writing for himself
and Justices Douglas and Brennan, argued that the Constitution
requires a full trial-type hearing before removal because the nature of the harm inflicted on the affected employee outweighs
the government's interest in administrative convenience and
efficiency.2 22 Justice White, in a separate opinion, argued that a
full trial-type hearing is necessary at some stage in the proceeding, but that the legislative choice to provide it only after the
dismissal is constitutionally permissible.2 2 3 Justice White thus
found in effect that the procedure outlined by the LloydLaFollette Act, taken by itself, is unconstitutional, and that its
modification by Executive Order 11491224 was constitutionally
mandated. Finally, Justice Powell, writing for himself and Justice
Blackmun, stated that the procedures should be determined by
balancing the government's interest in being able to act expeditiously in removing an unsatisfactory employee (an interest
which he found substantial) against the employee's interest in
retaining his job pending an evidentiary hearing. 225 Casting the
deciding votes on the constitutionality of current civil service
removal procedure, Justice Powell wrote: "On balance, I would
conclude that a prior evidentiary hearing is not required and
that the present statute and regulations comport with due process by providing a reasonable accommodation of the competing
interests. ' 2 6 What Justice Powell intended by "comport with due
process" is unclear. He could have meant that the present procedures are the constitutional minimum required, agreeing with
the substance of Justice White's opinion. On the other hand, he
could have meant that the present procedures are the constitutional maximum to which an employee is entitled and that
221 416 U.S. 134, 151-55. See text accompanying notes 200-02 supra.

222 416 U.S. at 217-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22
3 Id. at 185-86, 201-02 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
224 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
225416 U.S. at 168-69 (Powell, J., concurring).
226
Id. at 171.
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somewhat less process would also be constitutionally permissible.
The ambiguity in Justice Powell's concurrence thus leaves open
the question whether some vitality remains in the pre-Roth
emphasis on executive discretion in employee discharges.
The process required when a liberty interest is found is also
unsettled after Arnett. Justice Rehnquist cited the Roth footnote
that articulated the reason for a hearing on the infringement of
a liberty interest in reputation: " 'The purpose of such notice
and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his
name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his
employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.' "22 He interpreted the liberty
interest as being offended only by "dismissal based upon an
unsupported charge which could wrongfully injure the reputation of an employee" and found a hearing after dismissal "sufficient compliance" with due process requirements. 228 Justice
Marshall argued that a full trial-type hearing prior to dismissal is required where a liberty interest is involved. 2 9 Justice
White did not address the question, calling it an "entirely separate matter," 230 while Justice Powell said, characteristically: "I
find the present statute comports with due process even with
'23 1
respect to appellee's liberty interest.
Given the conflicting opinions in Arnett as to the nature of
the constitutionally prescribed minimum procedures in employee removal cases, the case establishes only that a discharge
from public employment must, in most cases, be pursuant. to
some constitutionally prescribed procedure. 2 32 Most importantly,
none of the cases decided to date have even raised the issue of
the procedures required in the type of employee removal most
essential to effective government administration: a discharge for
inadequate job performance. Roth, Sindermann, and Arnett all involved employees discharged for acts of misconduct, indeed for
public statements critical of the government's administration of
22

1 Id. at 157 n.22 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 -n.12
(1972)).
228
ld. at 157.
22
9 Id. at 217 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230
Id. at 178 n.6 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
231
1d. at 171 n.6.
232 At present, the normal procedure is an evidentiary hearing not only at the federal level but in state and local civil service systems as well. See, e.g.., N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAw § 75 (McKinney 1973); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11513 (West 1966), 19578 (West
1963).
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public programs. None of the employees involved was criticized
for inadequate performance of his own work.2 3 3 Yet it is in the
context of a discharge for incompetence that the prior judicial
emphasis on the importance of removals to government administration becomes most persuasive. Moreover, in this context,
the additional issue raised in Keim v. United States 2 4-whether an
evidentiary hearing, judicial or administrative, is even an appropriate mechanism to review a discharge based on a supervisory evaluation of employee job performance-becomes crucial
as well. In his concurrence in Arnett, Justice White hinted that
some room might remain for deference to executive discretion
in a discharge from government employment for incompetence:
A different case might be put, of course, if the
termination were for reasons of pure inefficiency, assuming such a general reason could be given, in which
case it would be at least arguable that a hearing would
serve no useful purpose and that judgments of this kind
are best left to the discretion of administrative officials.
This is not such a case, however, since Kennedy was
terminated on specific charges of misconduct. 3 5
The Requirements of ProceduralDue Process in a
Dischargefor InadequateJob Performance
In my opinion, a government employee should not be entitled under Roth, Sindermann, and Arnett to an evidentiary trial
prior or subsequent to a discharge based solely on inadequate
job performance. The reasons for this conclusion stem from
the crucial role of the removal process in the management of
government, as emphasized in the Parsons-Myers line of cases, 3 6
from the nature of the employee evaluation itself, as articulated in the Keim line of cases,2 3 7 and from the fact that an
B.

233 Moreover, like the plaintiff in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968),
neither plaintiff in Roth or Sindermann directed his criticism "towards any person with
whom appellant would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a
teacher. Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate supervisors or
harmony among coworkers is presented here." Id. at 569-70. Although the plaintiff in
Arnett did criticize his immediate supervisor, among others, his criticism charged criminal violations and thus, since the charges might be true, raised questions about the
motives of the supervisor in commencing the discharge action.
234 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
235416 U.S. at 186 (White, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).

236 See text accompanying notes 100-119 supra.
237 See text accompanying notes 129-34 supra.
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evidentiary trial is not necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the government employee against abuse of government power. 2338 This is not to say that a civil servant should be
entitled to no procedural protections prior to a discharge for
incompetence. There should be protections, but they should be
based on the need to build fairness into the government's personnel evaluation procedures rather than on the model of a
judicial trial.
1. The Nature of the Governmental Interest
In deciding what minimum procedures should be constitutionally required for employee dismissals, "consideration . . .
must begin," as the Supreme Court said in Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, "with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved. '23 9 The government, in discharging employees, exercises its power "as proprietor, to manage the internal operation" 240 of the government. As Parsons and Myers emphasized, 24 1 government as a
proprietor differs from government as regulator or lawmaker
for the general public because decisions about effective internal
administration are executive in nature, and thus ought properly
to be subject to executive control.
When government exercises its regulatory powers, that is,
when it acts outwardly upon some aspect of society, its assertion
that a procedure would impair governmental efficiency must be
balanced against the public's need to restrain that efficiency in
the interests of fairness. A government argument that its regulatory ability would be adversely affected by requiring a certain
procedure implies that the procedure, if adopted, would involve
more costly or time consuming administrative effort. In such a
case, the Supreme Court has held that administrative efficiency
must give way to individual rights:
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time,
effort, and expense, and it is often more efficient to
dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But
238 See text accompanying notes 274-311 infra. For articulation of the argument for
an even more expanded protection of government employees than that mandated by
Roth and Arnett, see Note, The Due Process Rights of Public Employees, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV.
310, 358-64 (1975).
239 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
4
I Id. at 896.
241 See text accompanying notes 100-119 supra.
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these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right. . . .Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accomodate all possible
interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests
of the person whose possessions [property] are about to
be taken. ". . . [T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly
say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that
may characterize praiseworthy government officials no
'24 2

less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.

Government employees, of course, have the same rights as
other members of the general public to challenge governmental
regulatory actions. In their capacity as employees, however, they
have never been given an equivalent ability to alter government
operations to protect their interests. The Supreme Court has
recognized consistently that the interests of the government as
employer necessitate greater control over employees than the
government could justify over the public at large. 243 The impact
of procedural requirements on governmental interests is much
more significant in matters of internal administration than in
matters of the government's regulatory capacity. Every governmental action-every job assignment, every demand for performance, every distribution of material support-favors some employees over others. Every personnel decision after the initial
hiring-whom to assign, promote, transfer, discipline, and discharge-of necessity adversely affects some employees. More is
at stake than cost or lost time when formal procedures are estab242 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972) (citation omitted) (quoting
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)). The Court has not consistently upheld the
Fuentes position that administrative convenience will not affect due process rights in a
regulatory context. While some cases have rejected administrative convenience arguments, see Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267-69 (1974); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970);
cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975), other cases have indicated that such an
argument is relevant to the due process analysis. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
788 (1973); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971). In its most recent statement on the issue, the Court emphasized that administrative considerations "must be
weighed" in formulating constitutional standards, thus undermining the Fuentes position
even in a regulatory context. Mathews v. Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4233 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1976).
243See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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lished for these internal matters; the government's very ability to
function demands considerable flexibility. As Justice Powell
pointed out in Arnett:
[T]he Government, as an employer, must have wide
discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged
retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory
employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in
the work place, foster disharmony, and 2ultimately
im44
pair the efficiency of an office or agency.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the distinction between administrative convenience in a regulatory context and
the needs of the government to manage its own internal operations in Schlesinger v. Ballard.24 5 The Court there upheld separate
promotion rights for men and women in the Navy, distinguishing two prior cases, Reed v. Reed 2 46 and Frontiero v. Richardson, 24 7 which rejected administrative convenience as the sole justification in a regulatory context:
In both Reed and Frontiero the reason asserted to
justify the challenged gender-based classifications was
administrative convenience, and that alone. Here, on
the contrary, the operation of the statutes in question
results in a flow in promotions commensurate with the
Navy's current needs and serves to motivate qualified
commissioned officers to so conduct themselves that
they may realistically look forward to higher levels of
command. This Court has recognized that "it is the
primary business of armies and navies to fight or to be
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.". . . The
responsibility for determining how best our Armed
Forces shall attend to that business
rests with the Con24 8
gress... and with the President.
That a governmental function concerns internal administration, of course, does not make it impervious to the requirements
244 416
2 5 419
246 404
247 411
248 419

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 168.
498 (1975).
71 (1971).
677 (1973).
U.S. at 510 (citations omitted).
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of the Constitution. A further inquiry must be made into
whether the governmental action can be subjected to judicial
scrutiny to protect individual rights without interfering with
appropriate executive functions. Thus the Wieman 24 9 and
Pickering250 Courts recognized that limiting the power of the
government to discharge employees for exercising their constitutional rights checked the abuse of executive power without impinging on the essentially executive responsibility of enforcing
job-related personnel management and discipline. 25 1 A requirement that an allegation of employee misconduct be tried at an
evidentiary hearing-if Roth, Sindermann, and Arnett are assumed
to mean at least that 25 2-- can be viewed as a similarly restrained
limitation on executive power. Government cannot justify a discharge for misconduct if the employee "in fact" is innocent of
the charge. Determination of guilt or innocence is the classic
function of an evidentiary hearing. 253 Requiring such a hearing
need not affect the government's ability to decide what acts of
misconduct are grounds for dismissal, assuming no allegation of
constitutionally protected activity. Even if there were a requirement that the act of misconduct be shown to be job-related,
and thus relevant to the government's interest in internal
administration,2 5 4 such a requirement would not impair the es249 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
25 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
251 See text accompanying notes 141-57 supra.
252 Some commentators assume that, after Arnett, an evidentiary hearing is always

required when the government discharges a civil servant. The only issue, they suggest,
is whether that hearing should be before or after the discharge. See, e.g., Comment,
supra note 97, at 488-95. If, however, an evidentiary hearing is not required at any time
for a dismissal for incompetence, see text accompanying notes 273-87 infra, it nevertheless seems likely that it is required at least for discharges for misconduct. In such cases,
an evidentiary hearing would be the functionally appropriate way to determine the
existence of the truth of the allegations of misconduct. See Friendly, supra note 175, at
1282-87; text accompanying notes 253-55 infra.
2 3 For a discussion of the functions and limitations of evidentiary hearings, see
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific,
Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 111 (1972); Cramton, A Comment on TrialType Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585 (1972); Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1956); Mashaw, The Management
Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772,
811-24 (1974); Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALE L.J. 1210 (1961).
254 A requirement that the reason for discharge be shown to be narrowly tailored to
the government's interest in effective work performance would seem necessary in cases
where basic freedoms are at stake. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); cf. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (homosexual conduct). See
generally Comment, Substantive Due Process: The Extent of Public Employees' Protectionfrom
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sential executive capacity to manage the government. The ability
of the government to discharge an employee for non-job-related
misconduct is not central to executive power, and a requirement
of relevance, as well as the protection of constitutional rights,
would be an appropriate method of checking abuse of power.
The governmental function of enforcing a level of job performance, however, is central to government's ability to manage
its operations, 255 and that function is singularly unconducive to
judicial scrutiny. Unlike the determination whether an employee
is guilty of an act of misconduct, the job of employee evaluation
includes the use of a supervisor's good faith subjective judgment.
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Keim v. United States, 2 56 the
essentially subjective nature of an evaluation of incompetence
makes the process a peculiarly executive one, so that a judicial
attempt to impose constitutional scrutiny of that judgment, absent proof of impermissible bias, would seriously impair the ex257
ercise of executive power.
In the government's regulatory capacity, its discretion cannot be based merely on subjective judgment, but must normally
be channeled by clear, articulated rules governing its actions.
Welfare cannot be terminated, 2 58 parole revoked, 2 59 or wages
subjected to garnishment 2 60 without established reasons. One
might doubt the constitutionality of a statutory scheme that allowed the government to take such actions without previously
articulated governmental rules simply because, for unspecified
reasons, the government thought the action wise. Such a statute
might be considered unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 26 1 or
Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1647 (1974). The requirement may not be necessary for other discharges. Cf. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973);
Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Transit
Authority's excluding all participants in methadone maintenance programs held unconstitutional).
255 See text accompanying notes 98-119 supra.
256 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
257 See text accompanying notes 129-34 supra.
2" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
259 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
260 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); cf. North Ga. Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
261 See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1132-42 (9th ed. 1975); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). Precision and tailoring in these contexts serve requirements of
notice which need not be as strictly enforced in the employer-employee setting. See
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the procedure adopted might be considered unconstitutional in
light of the individual's entitlement to statutory benefits. 262 Equal
protection rights might also be violated.26 3
Yet unarticulated subjective judgment has always been the
traditional basis for employee discharges for inadequate job performance, and plainly can continue to be so, even after Roth and
Arnett, for those employees without protected property interests
in their jobs. Indeed, as indicated above in the discussion of liberty interests,2 64 such an unarticulated judgment may be encouraged by Roth. The courts and the Congress have recognized that, absent any allegation of improper motive,2 6 5 a

supervisor's good-faith judgment is a legitimate-and perhaps
inevitable-basis for evaluating employee actions.26

6

Although

in some cases, such as routine jobs, a detailed standard of job
performance could be articulated, the development of predetermined standards of performance for every employee activity
has historically not been required, even in civil service jobs,
because of the belief that imposing such an obligation on the
government would be so burdensome that retaining an incompetent employee would be preferred to the impossible job of
developing the standards.267 Such a result has been considered contrary to the nation's interest and to the concept of the
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158-64 (1974) (plurality opinion). But see id. at 227-31
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
262 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970). See generally Note,
Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).

263Denying government benefits to some individuals and awarding those benefits
to others might be considered arbitrary or irrational if the classification of the individuals concerned were based on nothing more than the subjective judgment of the government agency administering the program. Cf. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443
(5th Cir. 1973) (irrationality of a classification based on honorable-dishonorable discharges).
264 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
265Of course, to the extent that reliance on subjectivity is merely a device to allow
discrimination, requiring objective standards for employment actions may be appropriate remedy. See G. COOPER, H. RABB & H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION

176 (1975). It does not follow that subjectivity is inappropriate absent proof of such
abuse.
266 Thus in the recent case of Efthemes v. Commissioners of Civil Serv., 514 F.2d
182 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court rejected a career civil servant's challenge of his removal
for inefficiency on the ground that substantial evidence did not exist to support it:
"[Tihere is ample record evidence of his job-related inefficiency; for example, his
supervisors described his performance as 'poor,' 'incomplete' and 'inaccurate.' . . . There
being a rational basis to the Commission's decision, we cannot disturb it." Id. at
184. 267
See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
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merit system itself. Since personnel administration has not developed to the point where the elements of job performance can
readily be articulated, ranked, and proven, recognizing the
legitimacy of employee evaluations necessitates recognizing, at
least in part, reliance on the judgment of supervisory personnel.
The nature of such a judgment, one so essentially executive
-particularly when it is properly regarded as a central feature
of the internal administration of the executive branch of
government-thus militates against judicialization of the evaluation process through an expansion of the concept of due process.
2.

The Interest of the Affected Employee

Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 268 however, requires us to look beyond the nature of the governmental
function in determining what due process requires. We must
determine also the nature of the "private interest ... affected by
governmental action,' 2 69 and then, presumably, find an appro-

priate balance between the two. If the inquiry into the private interest is to focus upon the substantiality of the impact
on the individual, one must concede quickly that the interest is
weighty indeed. Justice Marshall surely had the better of the argument in Arnett when he wrote of the grave consequences to
an individual of a dismissal from his job, particularly a dismissal
on the basis of poor job performance. 2 70 The chances are that a
person who is dismissed by the government for incompetence
cannot easily find another job. Welfare, despite Justice Powell's
suggestion in Arnett, 27 1 would often not be an available, let alone
an adequate, substitute. The economic and emotional impact of
dismissal and consequent unemployment can thus be catastrophic. But once this grave effect on the individual is established, it is uncertain how to weigh its importance against the
government's interest. One way is to "balance" the individual's
and the government's interests in each case, but such an approach may be inconclusive:
No scale has been calibrated which courts, legislators,
and administrators can use to sensitively and predict268 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
269
Id.at 895.
270 416 U.S. at 219-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
271Id. at 169 (Powell, J., concurring in part); cf. id. at 221 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ably measure either the relative severity of deprivations inflicted upon individuals or the relative importance of governmental interests in summary action.
... [J]udicial ieliance upon the interest-balancing doctrine necessarily makes unpredictable what procedures
27 2
are required by due process in particular cases.
A more feasible balancing approach for protecting both
employee and governmental interests is the requirement that the
procedure accorded a discharged employee be necessary to
guard effectively against improper removal. It should be obvious
that the functional utility of a procedure "clearly modifies the
weight of the individual's interests in obtaining [it]. '273 To justify
the requirement of an evidentiary trial in the case of a discharge
for incompetence in light of its effect on the government's interest in management of its own employees, one should have to
show that it would be not only useful but necessary to protect the
employee's interests. 274 It seems doubtful, however, that an

evidentiary hearing is either useful in establishing the existence
of competence or necessary to the individual's legitimate need
for protection against unfair governmental action. Indeed, other
procedures can better ensure fairness in this context. These asNote, supra note 262, at 1519-20 (footnotes omitted).
Id. 1519. Having argued the utility of a functional approach to due process, id.
1519-23, the Note proceeds to reject the approach as improper on the grounds that it
would deny procedural protection to individuals too easily, whenever the general welfare outweighed the need for those protections. Id. 1523-27. The Note proposes, apparently as an addition to a functional analysis, that an individual be entitled to the
protection of his procedural rights even if they conflict with the general welfare up to
the point where his rights conflict with the rights of other individuals. Under such a
test, Arnett becomes an easy case: since no other specific individual's rights would be
infringed by the employee's right to a hearing, the employee is entitled to the hearing.
Id. 1525-27, 1534-35. The difficulty with the Note's approach to Arnett is that it assumes
the existence of the right to a hearing, and therefore protects that right against a denial
on utilitarian grounds, when the true question in the Arnett type of case is whether the
employee has a right at all. Had the Note subjected the hearing envisioned in Arnett to
a functional analysis, I submit that, at least in cases concerning competence, it would
have found no right to protect. See text accompanying notes 274-87 infra. In this Article, I do not deal with the additional question concerning the circumstances under
which the government still can deny a hearing once functional utility is demonstrated. I
argue simply that the requisite functional utility cannot be shown to justify an evidentiary hearing in case of discharge for incompetence.
274 Cf. Friendly, supra note 175, at 1278. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W. 4224
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1976), the Court held that a recipient was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination of Social Security disability benefits, distinguishing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) not only because the impact on the recipient was less
severe but also because the potential value to the recipient of an evidentiary hearing
was substantially less than in Goldberg. Id. at 4232.
272

273
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sertions can best be understood by reference to an analagous
situation, that of students suspended or dismissed from school.
Last Term, in Goss v. Lopez, 2 75 the Supreme Court held that
some constitutional procedure is necessary before a student can
be suspended for misconduct. In the case of a suspension for ten
days or less, the Court held that a student must be given notice
of and a right to reply to the charges against him, but suggested
that longer suspensions or expulsions might require more formal procedures. Although conscious of the effect formal procedures might have on the educational process, the Court implied
that the necessity of formality turned on the extent of harm
imposed on the students.2 7 6 Yet if a student were discharged not
for misconduct but for failing his examinations, one would
doubt that the Court would require a judicial trial to determine
if he "in fact" failed his examinations, even if the penalty, expulsion, were greater than the penalty incurred in Goss itself. Basic
to the holding in Goss is the belief that the determination
whether the student is guilty of misconduct is a question of fact,
and that the establishment of certain procedures is both useful to
ascertain the correctness of that fact and necessary to protect the
student's interest. In contrast, a judicial trial to determine
whether a student failed his examinations would often not be
useful in determining the truth of alleged facts, because the
existence of failure is often not an ascertainable issue of fact.
The judgment of the instructor may itself be the fundamental
definition of the concept of "failing." A judicial trial on the issue
of failure implies quantification of the ingredients of failure, so
that the existence of these ingredients can be proven. But if such
a quantification is not a usual or necessary part of the judgment
of failure (as in complex examinations), the evidentiary trial
would either have to require the invention of such a quantification or simply ratify the good faith judgment of the instructor.
Because the courts could not adequately review the ultimate
academic judgment even if quantification were required, an
evidentiary trial would be without its traditional truth-finding
utility.
In Gaspar v. Bruton,2 77 a student practical nurse who had
successfully completed her examinations challenged her dismis275
276
277

419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 584.
513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
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sal for unsatisfactory performance in clincial courses. She
claimed that the Constitution required that she be given a full
evidentiary hearing prior to her dismissal to determine if in fact
she had performed incompetently in the clinical program. The
Board had already provided her with a full evidentiary trial after
her dismissal, but the Tenth Circuit said that even that was more
process than had to be accorded in the case of academic suspension or termination.
The Courts are not equipped to review academic
records based upon academic standards within the
particular knowledge, experience and expertise of
academicians. Thus, when presented with a challenge
that the school authorities suspended or dismissed a
student for failure re academic standards, the court
may grant relief, as a practical matter, only in those
cases where the student
presents positive evidence of ill
27 8
will or bad motive.
Similarly, in Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners, 9 the
plaintiff, who had failed the bar examination five times, claimed,
among other things, the right under procedural due process to
see his examination papers and compare them with those of
successful applicants to determine if he "in fact" had failed his
examinations. The court rejected the claim, saying that a comparison would be meaningless unless plaintiff were also able to
confront the bar examiners and obtain from them explanations
of the grades. The court said that such a procedure would place
280
an intolerable burden on bar examiners.
Of course, sometimes the issue of failure includes questions
of fact-whether the minimum number of correct answers were
given in an objective examination-but a judicial trial in such a
case is unnecessary to protect the student's basic demand for
fairness. Unlike the situation in which misconduct must be established, there is little room for doubt about what the facts are.
Ascertaining the facts in such a case is so simple that, absent an
allegation of bias or impermissible motive, an adequate check on
2 78

Id. at 851.

279 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
280

Id. at 478. See Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1103-05 (5th Cir. 1975), in
which the court rejected an argument that the due process clause required a hearing to
determine whether the plaintiff in fact failed the Georgia bar examination, holding
instead that reexamination would satisfy constitutional requirements.
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accuracy would be another look at the examination paper-a
supervisor's look would be the most that might be required. A
requirement of an evidentiary trial, burdensome without utility
in cases of subjective judgment, is burdensome without necessity
in cases in which the contested factual issues can be easily and
objectively resolved.
A discharge for inefficiency in the employment setting is
analagous to expulsion for academic failure in the education
setting, and ought similarly to be distinguished from cases of
misconduct. Although in a case of discharge for misconduct the
employer is in no better position to decide if the employee is in
fact "guilty" of the alleged act of misconduct than an impartial
third party would be, the day-to-day supervisor's poor rating of
the employee's performance is itself an important determinant
of the lack of competence.2 81 The Third Circuit in In-Cho Chung
v. Park282 recently recognized that this necessary subjectivity undermines the usefulness of an evidentiary hearing as a method
of establishing the correctness of factfinding. In In-Cho Chung a
biology professor challenged a state college's refusal to renew his
contract on the ground of poor job performance. The court said
that in this type of case, "[d]ue process should not be employed
to insure that this exercise of discretion is 'wise' but only that it is
2 83
not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
Here we are not dealing with a decision whether Dr.
Chung satisfied a specific set of statutory or administrative conditions which would have entitled him to continuing employment. Rather, we are concerned with an
exercise of discretion by the college administration as to
whether Dr. Chung was competent to perform the
duties of a professor. By its nature this type of decision
cannot be adjudged as correct or erroneous, but only as
28 4
reasonable or unreasonable.
Of course, it could be argued that an evidentiary trial would
be useful in establishing the issue of competency if formulated as
an issue of fact. The object of such a trial would be simply to
determine whether the employee had done what he was charged
with doing. But establishing the accuracy of facts is not really
281 See text accompanying notes 255-67 supra.

514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 364 (1975).
Id. at 387.
214 Id. at 387 n.8.
282

213
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how the process of employee evaluations works. Indeed, when
factfinding becomes the focus, the true issues in establishing
fairness in employee evaluations are often lost in the process of
28 5
resolving largely irrelevant factual disputes. Foster v. Laroque
sharply illustrates this problem. In that case, the plaintiff was
removed -as a clerk-stenographer on the basis of her inefficient
performance of duties. Her specific instances of inefficiency
were stamping an incorrect date on incoming mail, failing to
type a line of a report, using a wrongly numbered form for a
travel request, and making a typographical error in a certain
document. Although the plaintiff conceded that these incidents
had occurred as alleged, 28 6 she sought review of her dismissal
through the federal courts; the Supreme Court denied certiorari
over six years after her discharge. Her basic challenge seemed to
be that the allegations were trivial and insufficient to justify the
discharge. The courts refused to evaluate whether the charges
were sufficiently serious for an employer to base a dismissal on
them.
Yet if all an employer must do to discharge an employee for
incompetence is compile and prove such a list of mistakes, then
any employee can be discharged. Everyone makes mistakes. Unless the court establishes standards of incompetence, an evidentiary trial procedure designed to establish the facts on which the
charged incompetence is based seems pointless at both the judicial and administrative levels. But a judicial definition of incompetence would deny an administrator the ability to decide the
level of job performance that he, in good faith, deems necessary
for his employees. This would be a significant invasion of executive power. Although it might well be within the judicial role to
require that acts of misconduct be relevant to job performance
before they can be the basis of discharge,2 87 it would be quite
another matter for the judiciary to decide, absent an allegation
of bad faith or impermissible bias, that deficiencies clearly relevant to job performance are not "enough" for discharge. Before
such an invasion of executive power is required in the name of
due process, it should at least be justified by a showing that
judicialization by means of an evidentiary trial requirement is the
285 246 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd sub nom. Foster v. United States Civil

Serv. Comm'rs, 369 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1038 (1967). See
Blunt v. Hanon County School Bd., 515 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1975).
216 246 F. Supp. at 914 n.3.
287 See note 254 supra & accompanying text.
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only way to ensure fairness when an employee is discharged for
incompetence. But an evidentiary trial is not in fact necessary to
establish fairness in the employee evaluation process.
3.

Fairness in Employee Discharges

Fairness in cases of discharge for misconduct depends solely
on factfinding, assuming no allegations that constitutionally protected rights are involved or that the misconduct is not jobrelated. Resolution by evidentiary trial that the act of misconduct
was committed is dispositive of the issue whether the discharge
was fair. The key to fairness in the determination of competence, however, is not the resolution of purely factual issues but
the process used by a supervisor in evaluating that competence.
An employee is more likely to complain "I didn't know I had to
do (couldn't do) that" or "other guys get away without (with)
doing it" than he is to question the factual accuracy of the charge
against him. Factual disputes as to the quality or quantity of
work are usually resolvable at the time the issue arises; complaints about the process used to evaluate whether the quality
or quantity of work amounted to incompetence cannot be so
resolved.
To be fair, an evaluation process must provide adequate
notice to the employee of what is expected of him and adequate
warning about his deficiencies in fulfilling those expectations in
advance of discipline or discharge. An employee must have the
opportunity to perform as expected and be given the chance to
appreciate the consequences of failure. Thus the fairness of discharging a mail carrier for not delivering mail might turn on
whether it was his first or hundredth day on the job, whether he
was told what he had to do, and whether he was warned about
the consequences of failure. A finding that he "did it" does not
ensure fairness. 2 88 Moreover, if an evidentiary trial is necessary,
the employer is faced with taking an action immediately after the
occurrence of some improper behavior or accumulating offenses
until action is taken. Some have criticized the accumulation of
relatively minor offenses as being unfair. 28 9 Yet surely bringing a
288Cf United States Postal Serv. & Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Discharge of
Donald Orloski, Grievance No. N-E-83, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 469, at
209 (1972).
289 "[Discipline] cannot reasonably be read to permit a series of minor offenses to
pass relatively unnoticed, so as to accumulate a large number of them to support a
discharge. Discipline hardly can be effective and fair when it is not administered
promptly, with each offense dealt with on its own facts." Id. at 213; cf. TASK FORCE ON
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disciplinary action at the time of the first infraction would also
be unfair. Some system of regular communication seems to be
the essence of fairness in cases of evaluation of job performance.
Another problem of fairness in personnel evaluation stems
from a claim that the supervisor's evaluation was based on personal bias, since the employer-employee relationship is nothing if
it is not a personal, sometimes tormented, 290 relationship. Indeed, most personnel removal actions involve the personalities of
both the supervisor and the person evaluated, and indeed may
be as much a reflection of poor supervision and guidance as of
poor employee work performance. Fairness prior to discharge
would therefore require that another supervisor inquire into the
work situation to ensure that the discharge was justifiable. Such
an inquiry cannot be made simply by litigating the facts underlying the charge of incompetence. The additional inquiry must be
broader, and it of necessity involves the responsibility of management to evaluate supervisory personnel. If the bias alleged is
personal, or if the employee seeks to shift the fault to the supervisor, that kind of complex personnel issue can be resolved
properly only by other people in the organization in daily
contact with the employment situation; it is not the type of situation in which fairness can be determined by the judicial model
of a trial.
Only if the allegation of bias is one that might be institutionalized-such as racial, religious, or political prejudice
or the curtailment of the exercise of constitutionally protected
liberties-would it be necessary for an impartial third party to
make the evaluation. Wieman and cases following it suggest
no other need to restrict the government's ability to evaluate its
own performance. 29 1 There is, of course, a danger that the
higher-up might automatically side with the supervisor, but the
current judicialization does not solve that kind of "tilt" in the
system. 29 2 Only fairness in the internal employee evaluation proPERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE OF THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE 96 (1955).

290 For one author's view of this relationship, see J. HELLER, SOMETHING HAPPENED

(1974).
291 See text accompanying notes 141-63 supra; cf. Friendly, supra note 175, at
1279-80. When racial bias is a potential factor in the discharge, courts may be reluctant
to uphold the discharge even when substantial evidence of incompetence exists. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coffeeville Consol. School Dist., 513 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1975).
291 For a general discussion of methods used to by-pass the judicial mechanism, see
R. VAUGHN, supra note 16, at 13-27. The author sees the expansion of hearing rights as
a way to protect employees from arbitrary action. See id. 169-76.
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cess can significantly protect the employee from his supervisor's
personal animosity.
Given the central role of the evaluation process in the determination of the fairness of the judgment of incompetence,
the appropriate role of the courts-and the concept of due
process-in reviewing employee discharges for inadequate job
performance is a review of the fairness in that process. Such a
review of the process is all that is necessary, or even useful, to
establish fairness in such cases. The close relationship between
fairness and the internal evaluation process is consistent with
modern theories of personnel management, which suggest that
requiring a trial-type inquiry into facts underlying a supervisor's
decision to discharge impairs, rather than promotes, both fairness and effectiveness in personnel management.
The classic exposition of current approaches to employee
evaluation is Douglas McGregor's comparison of two concepts of
personnel management, which he labels Theory X and Theory
Y. 293 Theory X, the traditional approach, is based on the assumption that individuals avoid work if they can, and that to
make them work they need to be "coerced, controlled, directed,
[and] threatened with punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives. 29 4 Theory X is management by superior force. In contrast, Theory Y emphasizes creating work incentives through
participatory leadership, with the key to personnel management
being the creation of a job environment encouraging an
employee's commitment to his work. According to Theory Y,
employees "will exercise self-direction and self-control in the
service of objectives to which [they are] committed. '2 95 The
manager must work jointly with his employees to set goals for
the job to be done and methods to evaluate success or failure.
The object is management by objective rather than management
by control. There has been an increasing shift to the use of
2 96
Theory Y in private business.
293

D.

MCGREGOR,

THE HUMAN

33-57 (1960). See also D.
(1966); McGregor, An Uneasy Look at PerforSept.-Oct. 1972, at 133.
SIDE OF ENTERPRISE

MCGREGOR, LEADERSHIP AND MOTIVATION

mance Appraisal, 50

HARV.

Bus.

REV.,

294 D. MCGREGOR, THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE, supra note
9

293, at 34.

2 5 Id. 47.

296See, e.g., Allen, M for Management: Theory Y Updated, 52 PERSONNEL J. 1061
(1973); Greiner, What Managers Think of Participative Leadership, 51 HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 111; White & Barnes, Power Networks in the Appraisal Process, 49
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1971, at 101, 108; cf. Morse & Lorsch, Beyond Theory Y, 48
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Current governmental personnel evaluation procedures, encouraged by the judicialization of the removal process, are firmly
based on Theory X. The system of regular written evaluations of
the inferior by the superior, with discipline based on the concept
of building a record against the employee in the preparation for
trial, necessitates an adversary employer-employee relationship.
McGregor claims that this Theory X approach is unfair both to
the management and the employee since it will not only fail to
improve work performance, but will also fail to produce effective
evaluation of the employee. Because managers are "uncomfortable when they are put in the position of 'playing God' "297 with
people's lives, the task of evaluation is often left undone. Employees are not encouraged to work, but neither are they fairly
evaluated. The result is that employees are often not treated in
accordance with their performance, whether favorably or unfavorably. Reliance on Theory X, together with the difficulties of
judicialization itself, may help explain why few people are now
fired from government for incompetence.2 9 8
If government were to adopt Theory Y as its personnel
approach, the combat relationship inherent in the judicial model
would be eliminated. The employer would no longer be expected to keep a record of his employee's faults; the employee
evaluation would be by regular communication between the parties. This does not mean that there would be no evaluation of the
employee's work performance. If the employee failed to perform when given not only notice of what was reasonably expected of him but also the ability to participate in foripulating
those expectations, he would be discharged. 29 9 But if that process was fair-if the employee was given a fair chance to do the
job-the employee should not then be allowed to litigate either
administratively or judicially whether his discharge was "right."
Theory Y could not work if an adversary relationship always
lurked in the background. The key to the success of Theory Y is
the fairness in the employer's relationship with the employee. A
government experiment with a Theory Y evaluation process,

HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1970, at 61; Thompson & Dalton, Performance Appraisal:
ManagersBeware, 48 HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1970, at 149.
297 See McGregor, An Uneasy Look at PerformanceAppraisal, supra note 293, at 134.
2 98
See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
299 McGregor recognizes that reliance on managerial judgment is still necessary
under Theory Y. See D. MCGREGOR, LEADERSHIP AND MOTIVATION, supra note 293, at
188, 195-96.
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without a trial as to the underlying facts, ought not to be constitutionally impermissible.
The second Hoover Commission confirmed McGregor's
analysis of the defects of Theory X when it found that requiring
a judicial trial for incompetence has both hampered government
management and necessitated a process that is detrimental to the
employee.
A judicial proceeding such as an appeal under Section
14 [of the Veterans Preference Act] leads to the worst
kind of supervisor-employee relations because it requires the building of a written record and the accumulation of formal evidence sufficient to stand up as a
support for the supervisor's action. It relieves the employee of any necessity for demonstrating his competence and usefulness to his department, and in effect,
guarantees him a job unless his supervisor can prove
in a formal proceeding that he is incompetent. This
leads to working situations which are intolerable.
If the supervisor acts on his best judgment, he normally disciplines or separates an employee as soon
as the misconduct occurs or the incompetence is evident. But, if he does so, he may be unable to substantiate his action judicially because he has not waited to
accumulate documentary evidence. In other words,
there now tends to be a fairly long series of events
leading up to a final action by a supervisor. The requirements of Section 14 emphasize the need to build
a record to "get" someone rather than encourage good
. This sort of
employer-employee relationships. .
struggle does not help the organization, the employee,
00

or the supervisor.3

If "due process" requirements were interpreted to emphasize procedural fairness in the internal employment process
rather than the existence of facts underlying competence, the
Constitution might also begin to protect the great bulk of employees who lose their jobs not after a trial but after a closed
door, heart-to-heart talk with the boss.3 0 ' It might also protect
note 289, at 96.
See R. VAUGHN, supra note 16, at 15-16. Plaintiffs who resign now have the
difficult burden of proving that their resignations were involuntary. Without such a
showing, there is no "taking" of a property interest in violation of Roth and Arnett.
300

301

TASK FORCE ON PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE, supra
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some of those who resign because they are passed over for promotion or given undesirable job assignments. As any employer
will tell you, a formal action need not be brought to discharge
an employee. Work can be made unpleasant enough to produce that effect without bringing an action. 30 2 Yet the solution
to these informal removals-so full of the dangers of abuseought not to be the requirement of an evidentiary trial on the
exercise of the management judgment about promotion or
work assignment. A requirement of some sort of internal procedure to ensure that bias or irrelevant motives are not the
basis for the personnel action would be more appropriate. If
a fair procedure was followed, the courts should not look into
whether the promotion or work assignment was "right." If no
procedures were followed, the courts should not impose a procedure based on a judicial model, but could require that the executive design one of its own choosing.
An example of an effort at establishing fairness in employee
promotion that has attracted much attention is the development
of assessment centers, 30 3 in which company managers spend a
number of days independently assessing candidates for promotion. After a series of tests, interviews, and other exercises, the
managers evaluate the contestants in light of their capacity for
advancement. One could argue that such a process is unfair
unless the employee can have a trial-type hearing to determine
whether he "in fact" failed to meet the specified level of performance. Yet the assessment center seems a fair way of evaluation
in that it seeks to minimize the likelihood of any personal bias.
The government's adoption of an assessment center approach
for civil servants entitled to promotion should not be unconstitutional. A trial-type hearing should not be necessary simply because the penalty of not being promoted seems grave enough to
require one. Rather, the issue should be whether the methods
adopted by the government give the competing employees a fair
chance of advancement.
It might be objected that the concept of due process advanced here simply is not enough to protect a civil servant. If the
Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 588-89 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Gratehouse v. United
States, 512 F.2d 1104 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
302 R. VAUGHN, supra note 16, at 19-25.
303 See, e.g., Byham, Assessment Centersfor Spotting Future Managers, 48 HARV. Bus.
REv., July-Aug. 1970, at 150; Wilson & Tatge, Assessment Centers-Further Assessment
Needed? 52 PERSONNELJ. 172 (1973).
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employer need not "prove" incompetence at a judicial trial, it
might appear that all employees become subject to termination
at executive will. Even if the real reason for discharge is irrelevant misconduct, bias, or politics, a mere supervisory judgment
of poor performance, reviewed by a friendly higher-up in the
agency, could serve to discharge anyone successfully and without
controversy. This would seem particularly unfair in the civil service, where everyone has proved a level of competence by being
appointed through a merit system in the first place. An evidentiary trial might seem necessary to prevent a recurrence of the
spoils system or, perhaps worse, a government by arbitrary
power.
Such an argument is based on a series of misapprehensions.
The result of a reformation of the concept of due process as
suggested here merely shifts the burden to the employee to
prove that his discharge is based on political or otherwise inappropriate motives. This is where the burden normally rests when
a plaintiff alleges denial of procedural due process.3 0 4 Once
there is some evidence of impermissible motive, an evidentiary
trial on the existence of such a motive is appropriate. But the
government will retain the power to discharge the individual
without trial if such a motive is not proven. No doubt placing the
burden of proof on the employee and strengthing the reliance
on executive discretion increases the power of the executive over
its employees. Such a shift of power is the purpose of the change
in procedures. If that power is exercised in accordance with fair
personnel procedures, however, the Constitution ought not to
prohibit such power in the relationship between the government
and its civil service.
Nor can it be maintained that civil servants are entitled to
greater protection of job security because they have proven their
competence merely by being hired in the first place. The assumption that the merit system ensures that appointments are
based on the merits of the candidates has lost much of its
force.3 0 5 In the early days of civil service reform, the Service was
304 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that his liberty or property has been
denied and that he is therefore "entitled" to certain procedures. Once a hearing is
granted he must then prove that the basis for the adverse action was in fact an infringement of his liberty or was otherwise unjustified. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
598 (1972).
305 See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 12; Savas & Ginsburg, The Civil Service: A Meritless
System?, 32 PUB. INTEREST 70, 75-77 (1973); Laing, supra note 16.
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confident that it could develop an examination to select the most
qualified candidates for any type of job. 30 6 Today, most major
civil service examinations, federal and state, including the Federal Service Entrance Examination, are under attack on the
ground that there is no validated relationship between passing
the test and good job performance. 30 7 Some cases have gone so
far as to indicate that the distinction between those who pass and
those who fail the test is simply arbitrary. 30 8 Moreover, the use of
even a validated written examination is unlikely to select the best
qualified candidates, since test scores can show only whether the
applicant could perform a particular job, not whether he has
performed in prior jobs or will perform in the job at hand.
Indeed, the reliance of state and local civil service systems on
promotional examinations rather than on performance evaluation as the criterion for advancement has been criticized as a
major factor in undermining the incentive for good job performance in the government service. 30 9 Finally, even if reliance on a
written examination were proper, the list of those eligible to take
the examinations is often compiled so far in advance that many
qualified people will already have taken other work prior to the
administration of the examination. And other factors, veterans'
preference being the most common,3 10 may even preclude hiring
the person with the highest score on the list of successful examinees. Of course, the process may produce the best people,
but not necessarily. Once the employees are hired, the extensive
use of a probationary period before permanent status is awarded
is unlikely to weed out all those not fit to continue. A decision to
discharge a provisional appointee often means a long delay before the agency can find a replacement, if indeed a replacement
can be made. Supervisors are reluctant to trade an existing em-

VAN RIPER, supra note 29, at 194.
E.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Federal Service Entrance Examination); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 33 (1975); NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
910 (1975); Bridgeport Guardians v. Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Jones v. Human Resources Adm'n, 391 F. Supp.
1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
308 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1177 (2d Cir. 1972).
309 See Savas & Ginsburg, supra note 305, at 77-79.
30 Veterans were given preference in the federal service on an informal basis until
1865, when the first of a series of statutory preferences was enacted. D. ROSENBLOOM,
supra note 26, at 133-34. See generally UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, VETERANS
PREFERENCE IN FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT (1957).
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ployee of any quality for the mere possibility that the system
may produce someone better.
It might be objected that requiring some constitutionally
prescribed minimum procedure in internal employee evaluation
is too great, rather than too narrow, a limitation on executive
personnel management. If the courts are going to review such a
purely executive function as the executive's personnel process,
then the unwarranted judicial invasion of the executive's power
over its employees, objected to in the history of the federal cases,
will still occur. But as long as Arnett's holding that civil servants
have a property interest in their jobs remains valid, 3 11 some judicial incursion into the personnel process is unavoidable.
Moreover, the limitation on the executive to use a fair procedure
of its own design is considerably less an invasion of the executive
function than the imposition of a judicially designed procedure
modeled on an evidentiary trial. Some sort of review of executive
procedures in light of the current standards of fairness is a traditional judicial function. As long as the review does not freeze the
executive into a particular conception of a fair procedure, the
imposition of the concept of fairness in the management of government is not unjustifiable.
4.

Requirements for the Protection of "Liberty"

If the civil servants who have a "property" interest in their
jobs cannot demand an evidentiary trial prior to discharge for
incompetence, they, and government employees without property interests, ought not to be able to demand such a trial because of a "liberty" interest in their reputations. The Roth
definition of liberty3 12 need not require a judicial trial in the case
of every discharge for incompetence. Some courts have held that
mere criticism of work performance, not being a charge of immorality or infamy, is insufficient to constitute a deprivation of
liberty interests. 31 3 Others have assumed, however, that the protection of liberty now prevents any impairment of reputation by
government without judicial trial. In dealing with this broader
view, the Fifth Circuit has held that the liberty interest can be
protected if the grounds for discharge are not made public, even
if they exist in a confidential file describing the personnel
3,,

See text accompanying note 193 supra.
See text accompanying note 214 supra.
3,1 Calo v. Paine, 385 F. Supp. 1198, 1205-08 (D. Conn. 1974); Berry v. Hamblin,
356 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
312
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action. 3 14 Such a notion would allow the government to discharge individuals without an evidentiary trial for stated reasons,
even for cause, if the government specifies the basis for discharge only to the individual and not to future employers. It
may be objected that if the employee knows the reason, he will
have to tell a future employer when asked, and thus ought to be
able to challenge the accuracy of the allegation. 1 5 Such reasoning, if accepted, would require a judicial trial in every case.
Perhaps the government can protect the individual by specifically forbidding inquiry into the government's ground for
discharge, a procedure that would protect the public sector's
flexibility at the expense of prohibiting the private sector from
gaining relevant knowledge of its employees.3 1 6 Even if that were
done, one still would be left with the difficulty that any such
employee, merely because of a discharge for unexplained
reasons, would find it difficult to find a future job. Yet Roth has
already indicated that such a difficulty is not itself a violation of
3 17
the liberty interest protected by the Constitution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this Article that Roth, Sindermann, and-Arnett need not be interpreted as mandating what most of the
history of government employee relations and of the federal
removal cases has sought to avoid: a required evidentiary trial
prior to a discharge for incompetence. Instead, if the executive
establishes safeguards regulating the evaluation process itself,
these safeguards should be sufficient to satisfy the modern concept of procedural due process. One cannot be sure that the
approach to procedural safeguards outlined here will protect
individuals adequately from arbitrary government power.
Perhaps President Kennedy's 1962 extension of the notion of an
114 Ortwein v. Mackey, 511 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857,
863 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). Cf. Greenhill v. Bailey,
519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975), in which the court, having held that the discharge of a
medical student for lack of intellectual ability violated the student's liberty interest because the information was communicated outside the school, limited the due process
procedure to notice and a right to reply, and rejected the necessity of a trial-type
hearing.
315 Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857, 865 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (Tuttle, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
316 See Casey v. Roudebust, 395 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D. Md. 1975) requiring defendant
either to provide a hearing or to remove from his files "all material relating to the
reason for the termination ..
"
317 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 n.13 (1972).
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outside review by evidentiary trial 3 18 is a wise and necessary step
toward the protection of the individual. But in this area of uncertainty, an area critical to the power of the executive to control
the government itself, one should not transform recent wisdom
into constitutional mandate. Flexibility to fix the balance between
the needs of executive authority and the protection of individual
rights ought to be preserved unless there is only one way to
ensure basic fairness. The judicialization of the employment
process is too new to become the constitutional definition of
fairness, especially in light of weaknesses already apparent. Government employment may be neither a privilege nor a right, but
it is a function central to the future of the country. The formulation of the proper protection of that function from executive
power has been a subject debated throughout the nation's history. The difficult process of achieving the elusive balance of job
security and proper administration must not be denied continuing development through the political process.
318

See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.

